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INTRODUCTION 
The United States has turned away immigrants infected with the 
human immunodeficiency virus ("HIV") under the public health ex­
clusion of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA")1 since the 
mid-1980's.2 Since Congress codified the HIV exclusion in 1993,3 any 
* The author would like to thank the attorneys at the HIV Law Project in Manhattan 
for helping to conceptualize this project and Professors James Hathaway and Nina 
Mendelson for their insightful comments. 
1. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1 101-1525 (1994 & Supp. 1999). The 
public health exclusion, found in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(l)(A), states that immigrants who have 
a "communicable disease of public health significance" are inadmissible. It is one of several 
grounds of inadmissibility found in the INA. Prior to 1993, the Secretary of Health and Hu­
man Services had the discretion to decide which communicable diseases should render aliens 
inadmissible. 
2. As discussed in Part II.A infra, the Public Health Service added acquired immune 
deficiency syndrome ("AIDS") to the list of dangerous contagious diseases excludable under 
452 
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alien applying for an immigrant or nonimmigrant visa, adjustment of 
status to lawful permanent resident, or refugee status must first have a 
blood test for HIV.4 The HIV exclusion is not absolute, however. Each 
HIV-positive alien can apply for one of two waivers of the HIV exclu­
sion that are available in the INA. When an alien applies for immi­
grant or permanent resident status, he must disclose his HIV status on 
the application and, if he is HIV-positive, may simultaneously apply 
for a waiver of the exclusion. The first waiver, available to general 
immigrants under the INA, requires the immigrant to have an imme­
diate family member in the United States who is a citizen or lawful 
permanent resident.5 The idea behind this requirement is that family 
members will help to care, financially and otherwise, for HIV-positive 
relatives, thus relieving the financial burden on the government. The 
second waiver, available for "special" immigrants such as refugees, 
gives the Attorney General discretion to waive the exclusion "for hu­
manitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in 
the public interest."6 In other words, this humanitarian waiver is re-
the INA in 1987. See Peter A. Barta, Note, Lambskin Borders: An Argument for the Aboli­
tion of the United States Exclusion of HIV-Positive Immigrants, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 323, 
327 (1998) (describing the adoption of the AIDS exclusion). 
3. Pub. L. No. 103-43, 107 Stat. 122, 210 (1993). As a result of the 1993 Amendment, the 
INA declares inadmissible any alien "who is determined (in accordance with regulations 
proscribed by the Secretary of Health and Human Services) to have a communicable disease 
of public health significance, which shall include infection with the etiologic agent for ac­
quired immune deficiency syndrome." 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(l)(A)(i) (1994). 
4. See 42 C.F.R. § 34.3(b) (1999) (discussing the requirements for serologic HIV testing 
of immigrants). 
5. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(g) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999): 
The Attorney General may waive the application of -
(1) subsection (a){l){A){i) in the case of any alien who -
{A) is the spouse or the unmarried son or daughter, or the minor unmarried lawfully 
adopted child, of a United States citizen, or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent resi­
dence, or of an alien who has been issued an immigrant visa, or 
(B) has a son or daughter who is a United States citizen, or an alien lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence, or an alien who has been issued an immigrant visa . . . .  
6. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(3) (1994). This section, which permits HIV waivers for certain 
refugees and asylees, reads: 
(T]he Attorney General may waive (the public health exclusion] with respect to such an 
alien for humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public 
interest. Any such waiver by the Attorney General shall be in writing and shall be granted 
only on an individual basis following an investigation. 
Although the waiver articulated above is found in the refugee provision of the INA, it is 
reiterated in other sections of the INA that deal with special immigrants, such as the Chinese 
Student Protection Act. Chinese Student Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-404, 106 
Stat. 1969. Because this waiver is available "to assure family unity," it implicitly encompasses 
applicants who would qualify for the familial relationship waiver. Thus, even though an ap­
plicant cannot apply for both waivers, this waiver is broader, including applicants who would 
qualify under either waiver. See Rebecca Kidder, Note, Administrative Discretion Gone 
Awry: The Reintroduction of the Public Charge Exclusion for HIV-Positive Refugees and 
Asylees, 106 YALE L.J. 389, 400-03 (1996) (discussing the different waivers of the HIV exclu­
sion available under various provisions of the INA). 
454 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 99:452 
served for groups of immigrants whom Congress allows into the 
United States for humanitarian reasons. Which of the two waivers an 
immigrant can apply for depends on what type of immigration status 
he is seeking, because different waivers are available for aliens apply­
ing under various sections of the INA. When a new immigration law is 
enacted, Congress or the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
("INS") must decide which waiver should be available to HIV-positive 
immigrants applying under the new provision.7 
The INS recently had an opportunity to decide which of these two 
waivers should apply to newly enacted legislation. Congress passed the 
Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act of 1997 
("NACARA")8 and the Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 
1998 ("HRIF A"),9 which allow Haitian, Cuban, and Nicaraguan immi­
grants and illegal aliens who have been in the United States since 
December 1995 to adjust their status to that of lawful permanent resi­
dent.10 The humanitarian purpose of these laws, as this Note discusses, 
was to recognize and respond to the unique situations of these indi­
viduals who fled particularly horrific political conditions in their home 
countries by allowing them to reside permanently in the United 
States.11 NACARA and HRIFA (hereinafter "the Acts") constitute 
7. The INA includes all immigration laws. When a new immigration law is enacted, it 
enters the U.S. Code as an amendment of the INA, codified in 8 U.S.C. When Congress is 
silent on which waiver should apply to a new provision, the INS must decide which waiver is 
appropriate through rulemaking procedures. 
8. District of Columbia Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-100, Title II (Nicaraguan 
Adjustment and Central American Relief Act), 111  Stat. 2160, 2193 (1997) (amended by 
Pub. L. No. 105-139, 111  Stat. 2644 (1997)). While NACARA appears in the 1999 Supple­
ment to the United States Code as an amendment to 8 U.S.C. § 1255, this Note uses the 
public law citation. 
9. Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 
No. 105-277, Title IX (Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 1998), 112 Stat. 2681, 
2681-538 (1998). While HRIFA appears in the 1999 Supplement to the United States Code 
as an amendment to 8 U.S.C. § 1255, this Note uses the public law citation. 
10. Although both NACARA and HRIFA included a filing deadline of April 1, 2000, 
members of both the House and Senate introduced bills to extend the deadline, since the 
INS's final regulations in response to the Acts did not come out until March 24, 2000. See 
146 CONG. REC. S617-19 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2000) (introduction of S. 2058 by Sen. Graham); 
146 CONG. REC. E64 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 2000) (statement of Rep. Meek). The Senate 
Judiciary Committee approved the legislation to extend the deadline on April 13, 2000. See 
Michael Posner, Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans May Get New Residency Status Deadline, 
THE NATIONAL JOURNAL, COMMITfEE MARKUPS AND VOTES THuRSDAY, APR. 13, 2000 
(describing the Senate Judiciary Committee markup of S. 2058). Since the 107th Congress 
began in January 2001, a bill extending the deadline of HRIFA and NACARA has already 
been reintroduced in the House and referred to the House Judiciary Committee. Central 
American and Haitian Adjustment Act of 1999, H.R. 348, 107th Cong. (2001). 
1 1. See DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 
1998, S. PRT. 106-23, at 657-68 (Haiti) (1999) (discussing ongoing human rights abuses in 
Haiti); DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1997, 105 
CONG., at 481-94, 591-601 (Cuba and Nicaragua) (1998) (discussing ongoing human rights 
abuses in Cuba and Nicaragua); see also IRWIN P. STOTZKY, SILENCING THE GUNS IN HAITI: 
THE PROMISE OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (1997); Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, lmmigra-
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exceptions to the general adjustment of status provision under the 
INA, in that they grant permanent resident status to applicants even if 
they are inadmissible for many reasons, including illegal entry and po­
tential financial burden on the govemment.12 Applicants under the 
Acts are still subject to some of the inadmissibility provisions that are 
barriers to adjustment of status, including the HIV exclusion. 
In regulations adopted pursuant to the Acts, the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service requires HIV-positive applicants under the 
Acts to apply for the waiver of the HIV exclusion that is dependent on 
the applicant's immediate family relationship with a United States citi­
zen or permanent resident.13 The INS regulations with respect to waiv­
ers of the HIV exclusion do not allow HRIFA and NACARA appli­
cants to apply for the waiver for humanitarian reasons available to 
other HIV-positive refugees and special immigrants.14 Seemingly, it 
would be easier for HIV-positive applicants to assert humanitarian · 
reasons for the INS not to deport them in their waiver applications 
than to prove the requisite family relationship because HRIF A and 
NACARA constitute Congress's recognition that the United States 
should not send these applicants who have been living in the United 
States since 1995 back to Haiti, Cuba, and Nicaragua. Thus, the INS 
effectively chose the waiver with more difficult requirements for HIV­
positive applicants to meet. 
tion Challenges and Opportunities in a Post-Transition Cuba, 16 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 234 
(1998). 
12. The Acts allow for adjustment of status for an alien who "is otherwise admissible to 
the United States for permanent residence, except that, in determining such admissibility, 
the grounds for inadinissibility specified in paragraphs (4) [public charge], (5) [labor certifi­
cation], (6)(A) [aliens previously deported], (7)(A) [documentation requirements], and 9(B) 
[guardians accompanied excluded persons] of section 212(a) [of the INA] shall not apply."§ 
902 (a)(l)(B), 112 Stat. at 2681-538 (HRIFA). The same language is included in NA CARA. 
§ 202 (a)(l)(B), 111 Stat. at 2193. 
13. 8 C.F.R. § 245.13 (c) (2000) (NA CARA); 8 C.F.R. § 245.15(e)(2) (2000) (HRIFA). 
These regulations refer HIV-positive applicants seeking waivers of excludability to a section 
of the C.F.R. that requires applicants subject to the public health exclusion to have a quali­
fying familial relationship with a United States citizen or permanent resident. See 8 C.F.R. § 
212.7(4)(b)(l) (2000) (authorizing a waiver under § 212(g) of the INA, which requires a 
family relationship). See also Adjustment of Status for Certain Nationals of Haiti, 65 Fed. 
Reg. 15,835 (Mar. 24, 2000) (introducing the Final Rule for both NACARA and HRIFA, 
eight days before the statutory filing deadline). 
14. In its discussion of its final rule for HRIFA, the INS addressed comments it received 
relating to which waiver should be available for HIV-positive applicants under HRIFA. The 
INS rejected the possibility of allowing the humanitarian waiver for HIV-positive applicants, 
concluding that this waiver only applied to the adjustment of status of refugees under 8 
U.S. C. § 1159, and that the INS did not have the statutory authority to adopt the humani­
tarian waiver here. See Adjustment of Status for Certain Nationals of Haiti, 65 Fed. Reg. at 
15,837. As this Note argues, the INS misconstrued the legislative intent behind the Acts and 
their position within the INA as a whole. The INS did, however, open the possibility that 
HIV-positive Haitians who were paroled into the United States for the purpose of receiving 
medical treatment could be given a discretionary waiver. See 8 C.F.R. § 245.15(e)(2) (2000). 
It is unclear how this discretion would help Haitians without qualifying family members, 
however, since the familial relationship is mandatory to obtaining such a waiver. 
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This Note considers the appropriateness of the INS's HIV waiver 
regulations under HRIF A and NA CARA. Courts generally afford 
administrative agency interpretations of statutes great deference un­
der the Chevron doctrine, unless the agency regulation is contrary to 
legislative intent.15 Chevron requires courts to review administrative 
actions under a two-pronged analysis to determine whether the 
agency's regulation is an abuse of its congressionally delegated discre­
tion.16 Under the first prong, a reviewing court determines if Congress 
clearly addressed the precise question; if it did, and the agency regula­
tion does not match Congress's clear intent, the agency abused its ad­
ministrative authority.17 If Congress's intent is not clear, the court 
turns to the second prong of Chevron, under which it must defer to the 
agency's construction of the statute as long as that construction is 
permissible.18 
Subsequent courts have clarified what "clear" intent under the first 
prong entails, determining that legislative intent need not be clear on 
the textual surface and that courts may look beyond the text of the law 
to determine whether Congress's intent was clear.19 The Supreme 
Court has adopted a holistic approach to statutory construction, which 
requires courts to look beneath the surface of the statute to divine 
legislative intent.20 The Fourth Circuit in Brown & Williamson To-
15. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
16. See id. at 842-43. 
17. See id. ("First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the 
precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for 
the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of 
Congress.") (citation omitted). In a footnote following the previous quotation, the Court 
clarified that intent should be determined through the traditional tools of statutory construc­
tion: 
The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject ad­
ministrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent . . . .  If a court, 
employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an inten­
tion on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect. 
Id. at 843 n.9 (internal citations omitted). 
18. See id. at 843 ("If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly ad­
dressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction 
on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. 
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for 
the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the stat­
ute.") (citations omitted). 
19. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. · 
REV. 2071, 2091 (1990) ("The Court's own decisions, however, suggest that the mere fact of 
a plausible alternative is insufficient to trigger the Chevron rule."). But see Antonin Scalia, 
Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke L.J. 511, 520 (arguing 
that a statute should be regarded as ambiguous when "two or more reasonable, though not 
necessarily equally valid, interpretations exist"). 
20. See Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 519 U.S. 465, 475 (1997) (dem­
onstrating through its reasoning that courts should consider "the history of evolving congres­
sional regulation in the area"); Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (reasoning 
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bacco Corporation v. FDA synthesized the Court's "holistic approach" 
to statutory construction as involving four considerations: 1) the plain 
language of the statute; 2) the overall statutory scheme; 3) legislative 
history; and 4) a consideration of other relevant statutes.21 
If, after conducting this multi-faceted analysis under the first prong 
of Chevron, a statute is still ambiguous with respect to a specific issue, 
courts move on to the second Chevron inquiry: whether the agency's 
regulation is based on a permissible construction of the statute.22 Am­
biguity arises only after a reviewing court has looked for Congress's 
specific intent using all of the traditional tools of statutory construc­
tion: plain language, context and structure of the statute, and legisla­
tive history.23 Although courts generally give agencies more discretion 
if the statute is ambiguous,24 the regulation must still be reasonable "in 
that "Act[s] of Congress should not be read as a series of unrelated and isolated provi­
sions"); United States Nat') Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 455 
(1993) (instructing courts to " 'look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and 
policy' " (citing United States v. Boisdore's Heirs, 8 How. 113, 122 (1849))); Dole v. United 
Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26, 35 (1990) (" 'On a pure question of statutory construction . . .  
[o]ur starting point is the language of the statute,' . . .  but 'in expounding a statute we are not 
guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole 
law, and to its object and policy.' ") (citations omitted); United Savings Ass'n of Tex. v. 
Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988) (characterizing statutory 
interpretation as a "holistic endeavor": "A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is 
often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme . . .  "); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 
U.S. 421, 449 (1987) (utilizing the "ordinary canons of statutory construction," including the 
statutory language, its congruence with the international treaty, and the legislative history). 
21. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, 153 F.3d 155, 162-63 (4th Cir. 1998), 
affd, FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
22. See supra note 18. 
23. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997) ("The plainness or ambiguity 
of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in 
which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole."); NLRB v. 
United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S. 112, 123 (1987) ("On a pure question 
of statutory construction, our first job is to try to determine congressional intent, using 'tra­
ditional tools of statutory construction. ' If we can do so, then that interpretation must be 
given effect, and the regulations at issue must be fully consistent with it.") (citation omitted); 
Cont') Air Lines, Inc. v. Dep't of Transp., 843 F.2d 1444, 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("[W]e are 
not persuaded that Congress's intent is clear within the meaning of Chevron. That is to say, 
our employment of the traditional tools of statutory interpretation has left us in doubt as to 
what Congress had in mind on the precise issue at hand."). 
24. See Cont'/, 843 F.2d at 1453-54: 
[I]t is elementary in administrative law that, at least where Congress's intent is unknown, an 
agency's interpretation (if reasonable) is entitled to deference from the Article III branch. 
This notion is premised on the very nature of our system of government, with its time-tested 
separation of governmental powers . . . .  To depart from the culture of deference (again, as 
always, where Congress's specific intent on the question at hand is unclear) is to do violence 
to basic structural principles relied upon by Congress and the President in creating the 
agency in the first instance and endowing it with powers to interpret, administer and enforce 
that portion of the law of the land. 
See also Sunstein, supra note 19, at 2105 ("On the question of reasonableness, it seems clear 
that the agency must be given considerable latitude. But this is not to say that the agency 
may do whatever it wishes."). 
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light of the language, legislative history, and policies of the statute."25 
The reasonableness inquiry includes an examination of the agency's 
textual analysis of the statute, including its analysis of legislative his­
tory, and a determination of the compatibility of the agency's interpre­
tation to the congressional purposes behind the statute.26 If the regula­
tion is contrary to Congress's policy goals in enacting the statute, a 
court will find that it is not a reasonable interpretation of the law and 
thus an abuse of administrative discretion.27 In performing this analy­
sis, courts must consider Congress's goals in light of the legislative his­
tory of the statute, including compromises between competing goals.28 
This Note utilizes this holistic approach to statutory construction 
to argue that the INS regulations regarding the HIV exclusion under 
the Acts are contrary to clear congressional intent and thus an abuse 
of administrative discretion. This Note further argues that even if the 
intent of Congress is not clear and the Acts are ambiguous as to waiv­
ers of the HIV exclusion, the INS's regulations for HIV-positive appli­
cants are unreasonable in light of Congress's humanitarian purposes in 
enacting HRIFA and NACARA. Part I examines the plain language 
of the Acts, concluding that because Congress did not explicitly ad­
dress the HIV exclusion in the Acts, it is necessary to look elsewhere 
to determine legislative intent concerning this issue. Part II discusses 
Congress's intent behind the Acts and the HIV exclusion itself, con­
cluding that the most important reason behind the HIV exclusion -
cost - is not relevant under HRIFA and NACARA. Moreover, be­
cause Congress intended to create an unprecedented immigration 
remedy in response to political unrest in these countries, the adminis­
trative regulations under the Acts should reflect the congressional goal 
of giving the applicants - even the HIV-positive ones - special 
treatment. This discussion of legislative intent is relevant both to show 
Congress's clear intent under Chevron prong one and to evaluate the 
25. Republican Nat'! Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 76 F.3d 400, 406 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
(quoting Natural Res. Def. Council v. United States EPA, 822 F.2d 104, 111  (D.C. Cir. 
1987)). See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 392 (1999) (vacating an FCC rule 
because of the agency's unreasonable interpretation of the statute). 
26. See Cont'/, 843 F.2d at 1449 ("In our view, reasonableness in this context is to be de­
termined by reference both to the agency's textual analysis (broadly defined, including 
where appropriate resort to legislative history) and to the compatibility of that interpretation 
with the Congressional purposes informing the measure."). 
27. See id. at 1452 (" 'Reasonableness' in this context means, we are persuaded, the 
compatibility of the agency's interpretation with the policy goals (as carefully identified in 
the manner previously described) or objectives of Congress."). 
28. See id. at 1451 ("(P]recision of goal identification must be the order of the day . . . .  
(T]he goal (or more precisely, the competing and conflicting goals) must be identified with 
care and respect for the compromise-laden legislative process."); see also Republican Nat'/ 
Comm., 76 F.3d at 406 ("Examining again the statute and its legislative history, we find no 
basis for questioning the reasonableness of (the regulation at issue]. As we have already con­
cluded, nothing in the statute or its legislative history limits the Commission to requiring a 
single request, or precludes the Commission from requiring a follow-up."). 
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INS's reasonableness under prong two. Part III considers the INS 
regulations in light of other relevant immigration statutes and Con­
gress's overall statutory scheme for immigration law. A consideration 
of relevant statutes is useful in evaluating the regulations under both 
prongs of Chevron. Part III argues that because the INS treats HIV­
positive applicants differently under HRIF A and NACARA than un­
der other immigration laws based on similar legislative purposes, the 
INS violated Congress's intent to give HRIF A and NACARA appli­
cants the same protection as applicants under analogous laws. This 
Note concludes that the INS should voluntarily change the waiver re­
quirements in its regulations; courts should find the waiver regulation 
to be an abuse of administrative discretion and vacate the rule; or 
Congress should amend the law to specify that the humanitarian 
waiver is available for HIV-positive applicants.29 
I. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF NACARA AND HRIFA 
The first step in statutory interpretation is to look at the plain lan­
guage of the statute.30 Because the Acts do not mention the HIV ex­
clusion or waiver explicitly, the plain language of the Acts does not 
conclusively demonstrate Congress's clear intent with respect to HIV­
positive applicants. As mentioned above, the Acts allow Haitian, 
Nicaraguan, and Cuban nationals who have been continuously present 
in the United States since December 1995 and are otherwise admissi­
ble to adjust their status to permanent resident.31 Applicants are not 
29. Although both NACARA and HRIFA include a clause that limits the judicial re­
view of a decision by the Attorney General as to whether or not the status of any alien 
should be adjusted under the Acts, the Supreme Court has distinguished between judicial 
review of an administrative action on a particular case and judicial review of an administra­
tive regulation under an act of Congress generally. See Bowen v. Michigan Acad. of Family 
Physicians, 476 U.S. 667 (1986). In terms of the legislative reform solution, it is worth noting 
that the Central American and Haitian Parity Act of 1999, which was introduced in the Sen­
ate, included technical amendments to NACARA and HRIFA. Among the amendments 
was a provision that would grant the Attorney General discretion to waive the public health 
exclusion for humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the 
public interest. See 145 CONG. REC. S10944-45 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1999) (statement of Sen. 
Durbin concerning the bill, S. 1592). The last legislative action on this bill was in September 
1999, when it was referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. The Central American 
and Haitian Adjustment Act of 1999, which was reintroduced in the House in January 2001, 
would likewise amend the HIV waiver under NACARA and HRIFA. Central American 
and Haitian Adjustment Act of 1999, H.R. 348, 107th Cong. (2001). 
30. See Carninetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) ("It is elementary that the 
meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is 
framed, and if that is plain, and if the law is within the constitutional authority of the law­
making body which passed it, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its 
terms."); see a/so NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 81-83 
(5th ed. 1992). 
31. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text. 
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required to have been paroled32 or admitted into the United States, 
which means they need not have entered the country legally. The key 
phrase in the Acts relevant to the HIV exclusion is that applicants 
must be "otherwise admissible," which indicates that the grounds for 
inadmissibility of immigrants under the INA (including the HIV ex­
clusion) apply to HRIF A and NACARA applicants.33 The Acts ex­
plicitly waive some of the inadmissibility grounds, including the likeli­
hood of becoming a public charge, failure to obtain a labor 
certification, entering the country illegally, and violating documentary 
requirements for entry.34 The Acts do not waive the HIV exclusion, 
however, and do not specify which waiver should be available for 
HIV-positive applicants; in fact, the Acts do not mention HIV or the 
public health exclusion at all. 
Another interpretation of the Acts might conclude that the plain 
language is quite clear: Congress explicitly waived other inadmissibil­
ity grounds in the Acts, indicating that the legislators considered each 
32. Parole is an executive power used in part to accommodate large numbers of refugees 
temporarily. Since the adoption of the Refugee Act of 1980, the Attorney General has used 
parole to allow large groups of "refugees" into the United States who do not meet the tech­
nical refugee definition under the Act but should be allowed to stay temporarily for "urgent 
humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit." 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (Supp. V 
1999). Many HRIFA and NACARA applicants were paroled into the United States, al­
though it is not a requirement in the Acts. Because parole is only effective for a certain 
amount of time, when it expires, the parolee can be returned automatically unless the Attor­
ney General extends the deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(d) (2000). 
33. The Acts allow for adjustment of status for an alien who "is otherwise admissible to 
the United States for permanent residence, except that, in determining such admissibility, 
the grounds for inadmissibility specified in paragraphs (4) [public charge exclusion], (5) [la­
bor certification requirement], (6)(A) [aliens previously deported], (7)(A) [documentation 
requirements], and 9(B) [guardians accompanying excluded persons] of section 212(a) [of 
the INA] shall not apply." Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropria­
tions Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, Title IX (Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 
1998), Div. A, § lOl(h), (a)(l)(A), 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-583 (1998); Nicaraguan Adjustment 
and Central American Relief Act, District of Columbia Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 
105-100, Title II (Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act), tit. III, 111  
Stat. 2160, 2193 (1997) (amended by Pub. L.  No. 105-139, 111  Stat. 2644 (1997)). 
34. See statutory references supra note 33; see also INS Sets Application Procedures for 
Nicaraguans and Cubans Under NACARA, 75 INTERPRETER RELEASES 724, 725 (1998). 
The INS explicitly undermines the public charge waiver in its informal instructions to HIV­
positive HRIF A applicants on its website, by attempting to add a public charge requirement 
to HIV-positive applicants seeking waivers of the HIV exclusion. The INS website, under 
"Questions and Answers about HRIFA," includes the following information about HIV­
positive HRIF A applicants: 
Individuals must apply for a waiver under Section 212(g) of the INA. To be eligible an alien 
must have a qualifying family relationship and also demonstrate that: 
• Their illness will not pose a danger to the public health of the United States; 
• The possibility of the spread of infection is minimal; and 
• Their illness will not result in any cost being incurred by any government agency with­
out prior consent of the agency. 
Questions and Answers, at <http://www.ins.gov/graphics/publicaffairs/questsans/HRIFAQA. 
htm> (last visited Sept. 10, 2000). 
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of the inadmissibility grounds in deciding which ones to waive, and 
thereby made a conscious decision not to waive the HIV exclusion. 
This maxim of statutory interpretation, expressio unius est exclusio al­
terius ,35 dictates that where the legislature enumerates items that are 
excluded from the law, the items not listed should be assumed not to 
be excluded.36 While the expressio unius maxim makes logical sense, it 
must be used with caution. Because the maxim looks only to the text 
and organization of the statute to determine legislative intent, it 
should not be relied upon if other tools of statutory interpretation, 
such as looking to the legislative history and purposes behind the stat­
ute, indicate that Congress's intent was otherwise.37 Here, Congress's 
explicit waivers of other grounds of inadmissibility shed light on its 
priorities. Notably, the Acts waive the exclusion of immigrants who 
could someday become a "public charge" (i.e., a financial burden on 
the government), demonstrating that Congress was willing to ignore 
the financial risk of allowing potentially costly immigrants into the 
country - the major impetus behind Congress's adoption of the HIV 
exclusion in 1993.38 Additionally, the complete waiver of the public 
charge inadmissibility undermines the need for the familial relation­
ship waiver of the HIV exclusion. The requirement of an immediate 
family member in the United States is financially motivated, rooted in 
Congress's effort to ensure that there is someone other than the gov­
ernment to take care of HIV-positive immigrants medically and finan­
cially. The humanitarian waiver seems more appropriate, given Con­
gress's humanitarian - rather than fiscal - priorities evidenced on 
the face of the Acts and, as discussed in Section 11.B, in the legislative 
history. Thus, a brief look below the surface of the Acts indicates that 
the expressio unius argument is not dispositive of Congress's intent in 
this situation. 
Moreover, the expressio unius argument is only powerful as a re­
sponse to an argument for waiving the HIV exclusion entirely; if 
Congress intended the Acts to eliminate the exclusion, it would have 
done so explicitly when it waived other provisions. The issue in this 
Note, however, is not whether Congress intended to eliminate the 
HIV exclusion entirely, but which waiver of the HIV exclusion should 
be available to HRIF A and NA CARA applicants. In the Acts, Con-
35. Defined as: "the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 581 (6th ed. 1990). 
36. See SINGER, supra note 30, at 216-17. 
37. See id. at 234 ("(I)n the usual circumstances the application of the maxim is subordi­
nated to the basic rule of statutory construction that the intent of the statute prevails over 
the letter."); see also Bums v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 136 (1991) ("An inference drawn 
from congressional silence certainly cannot be credited when it is contrary to all other tex­
tual and contextual evidence of congressional intent."). 
38. See infra Section H.B. 
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gress is silent on the issue of which waiver of the HIV exclusion should 
be available. One might infer that this silence indicates that Congress 
intended the waiver requiring a family relationship, which is found in 
the general inadmissibility section of the INA and applied to all gen­
eral immigrants as a default. But legislative silence is not a dispositive 
indicator of legislative intent. 39 The text of the Acts, in terms of the 
permanent immigration relief they provide to a large number of refu­
gees, does not support the INS requirement that HIV-positive appli­
cants must have an immediate family member who is a United States 
citizen or permanent resident. Instead, the plain language of the Acts 
sheds light on Congress's broader purpose of providing widespread 
humanitarian relief, and the INS should have recognized this purpose 
and chosen the waiver for humanitarian reasons. 
The arguments above indicate that the plain language of 
NACARA and HRIFA can be interpreted both ways on the issue of 
which waiver should be available for HIV-positive applicants. But the 
holistic approach to discerning Congress's clear intent under the first 
prong of Chevron does not end with plain language or the absence 
thereof.40 Because the statutory language is ambiguous, further exami­
nation of the legislative history of the Acts and the HIV exclusion and 
the structure of the Immigration and Nationality Act is necessary to 
discern Congress's clear intent under the first prong of the Chevron 
analysis.41 
II. UNDERSTANDING THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF NA CARA 
AND HRIF A IN LIGHT OF THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE HIV 
EXCLUSION 
A consideration of the legislative history behind NACARA and 
HRIF A in light of the legislative history behind the codification of the 
39. See, e.g., Nat'!. Rifle Assoc. of Am. v. Reno, 216 F.3d 122, 129 (D.C. Cir. 2000) 
("Heeding the Supreme Court's recent warning, '[w]e do not rely on Congress's failure to 
act' as dispositive evidence of congressional intent.") (citation omitted); Brown v. Secretary 
of Health & Human Servs., 46 F.3d 102, 108 (1st Cir. 1995) ("[N]onaction by Congress is or­
dinarily a dubious guide . . . .  " (citing Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 1 15, 121 (1983))). 
40. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, 153 F.3d 155, 162 (4th Cir. 1998), 
affd, FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
41. Courts should refrain from looking at the broad purposes of legislation when the 
plain language of a specific provision of a law is unambiguous. See Trustees of the Chicago 
Truck Drivers (Independent) Pension Fund v. Leaseway Transp. Corp., 76 F.3d 824, 830 (7th 
Cir. 1996). When the plain language is ambiguous, however, courts should look to the legis­
lative history of the law. See Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. 
Robinson Cartage Co., 55 F.3d 1318, 1323 (7th Cir. 1995). Importantly, the ambiguity of the 
statutory language does not automatically indicate that Congress's intent was not clear in 
terms of the Chevron analysis. In other words, ambiguous language does not push the analy­
sis from Chevron prong one to Chevron prong two; rather, courts look beyond the statutory 
language to determine if Congress's intent was clear. See also Sunstein, supra note 19. 
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HIV exclusion of immigrants reveals that Congress viewed the finan­
cial reasons underlying the HIV exclusion as subordinate to its policy 
reasons for NACARA and HRIF A. Section II.A discusses Congress's 
policy reasons for enacting the HIV exclusion, demonstrating that the 
legislative history highlights the primary policy priority as a financial 
one. Section II.B discusses the legislative history of the Acts, which 
indicates that Congress intended the Acts to provide humanitarian re­
lief for immigrants who fled horrific conditions and should not be 
forced to return home. Additionally, the Acts reflect Congress's deci­
sion to further the United States' international foreign policy priorities 
in Nicaragua, Cuba, and Haiti and to provide immigration relief re­
gardless of the cost. This Part concludes that, given Congress's intent 
to grant widespread immigration exceptions to Nicaraguans, Cubans, 
and Haitians for both diplomatic and humanitarian reasons, the INS's 
strict waiver policy for HIV-positive HRIFA and NACARA appli­
cants (which focuses on avoiding costs) undermines congressional in­
tent. The INS should have recognized this humanitarian legislative in­
tent and chosen the more appropriate waiver of the HIV exclusion 
available under the INA - the waiver based on humanitarian reasons. 
A. Congress's Policy Reasons Behind the HW Exclusion 
To determine whether the INS's regulations concerning HIV­
positive applicants under HRIF A and NA CARA are consistent with 
congressional intent, it is necessary to consider the legislative intent 
behind Congress's creation of the HIV exclusion in immigration law 
generally. As the Supreme Court has directed, one level of holistic 
statutory construction under Chevron is a consideration of relevant 
statutes.42 The HIV exclusion, which is part of the INA, is relevant be­
cause every new immigration statute that requires applicants under it 
to be admissible, including HRIFA and NACARA, subjects appli­
cants to the HIV exclusion. This section examines the legislative intent 
behind the HIV exclusion, concluding that the primary reasons Con­
gress originally passed it in 1993 - financial and political concerns, 
not public health concerns - are not important under HRIF A and 
NACARA, because these Acts demote monetary concerns to secon­
dary status. This section then discusses Congress's intention to treat 
refugees differently than other immigrants with respect to the HIV ex-
42. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting that acts of Congress 
"should not be read as a series of unrelated and isolated provisions"); United Sav. Ass'n v. 
Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988) (statutory interpretation is a 
"holistic endeavor" that includes an examination of the statute's full text, its structure, and 
the subject matter); United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, 64 (1940) (" '(A)ll acts in pari ma­
teria are to be taken together, as if they were one law' " (quoting United States v. Freeman, 
3 How. 556, 564 (1845))); Brown & Williamson, 153 F.3d at 162. 
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clusion, concluding that, by analogy, HRIFA and NACARA appli­
cants should be treated differently as well. 
Although the United States has excluded aliens with communica­
ble diseases since the beginning of modern immigration law, the justi­
fication behind the exclusion has evolved from public health concerns 
to monetary and political concerns. The history of the public health 
exclusion goes back to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 
which declared immigrants who were infected with "any dangerous 
contagious disease" inadmissible.43 It was the responsibility of the 
Public Health Service ("PHS") (within the Department of Health and 
Human Services ("HHS")) to determine which diseases should be in­
cluded on this list. In 1987, the PHS added AIDS to the list.44 In re­
sponse, the Senate unanimously passed an amendment requiring the 
PHS to substitute HIV for AIDS on the list. This quick congressional 
response, at a time when Senators knew very little about this relatively 
new and mysterious virus, was a sign that the HIV exclusion was to be 
a politically charged issue, born out of fears of the American elector­
ate, rather than a reasoned scientific response to a health risk.45 Con­
gress diminished the impact of this amendment when it passed the 
Immigration Act of 1990,46 which replaced "dangerous contagious dis­
ease" with "communicable disease of public health significance" and 
granted authority to the Secretary of HHS to determine which dis­
eases fit this definition.47 
The permanent codification of the HIV exclusion was the result of 
a long political battle.48 As scientists learned more about HIV, HHS 
realized that the virus was communicable only through certain behav­
iors, not by casual contact like tuberculosis (the type of disease the 
public health exclusion was designed to prevent), and in 1991, Secre­
tary of HHS, Dr. Louis Sullivan, proposed that HIV be removed from 
43. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 212, 66 Stat. 163, 182 (1952). 
44. Barta, supra note 2, at 326. 
45. See Elizabeth Mary McCormick, Note, HIV-Infected Haitian Refugees: An Argument 
Against Exclusion, 7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 149, 157 (1993) ("The decision to act in this area 
may well have resulted from the belief that the rapid spread of this 'new' disease in the 
United States, coupled with fear and ignorance of the public about how it was spread, called 
for drastic measures."). Senator Helms led the charge for this amendment. See id. 
46. Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990) (codified in scattered sections of 8 
U.S.C.). 
47. 8 U.S.C. § 1 182(a)(l)(A)(i) (1994). 
48. In the debates over the codification of the HIV exclusion, Senator Simpson postu­
lated that the reason Congress wanted to take away the HHS Secretary's authority to deter­
mine which diseases were of public health significance was because HIV "has become now a 
political football . . . .  I have a feeling that that is exactly what this is, under the pressure of a 
political campaign and a political response and a political payoff." 139 CONG. REC. 2,870 
(1993) (remarks of Sen. Simpson). 
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the list.49 This proposal received a negative response from many con­
seratives in Congress and members of the general public.50 President 
Clinton took part in the debate as well, expressing his intention to 
eliminate the HIV exclusion shortly after taking office.51 Republicans 
in Congress responded by initiating an amendment to the National In­
stitutes of Health Revitalization Act of 1993 that provided that HIV 
would permanently constitute a "communicable disease of public 
health significance" under the public health exclusion.52 
The primary concern reflected in the congressional debates over 
this amendment was the enormous cost of treating HIV-positive im­
migrants.53 Editorials on the subject also focused on the financial bur­
den on taxpayers.54 One of the strongest arguments against the fiscal 
rationale behind the amendment was that the HIV exclusion was not 
necessary to prevent the costs to taxpayers because the INA already 
contained an exclusion of immigrants who were likely to become 
public charges.55 The amendment's supporters rejected this response, 
perhaps because the issue had become so highly politicized. 
49. Sullivan's reasoning for the proposed removal of HIV from the list of communicable 
diseases was: 
The risk of (or protection from) HIV infection comes not from the nationality of the in­
fected person, but from the specific behaviors that are practiced. Again, a careful considera­
tion of the epidemiological principles and current medical knowledge leads us to believe that 
allowing HIV infected aliens into this country will not impose a significant additional risk of 
HIV infection to the United States population, where prevalence of HIV infection is already 
widespread. Our best defense against further spread of HIV infection, whether from a U.S. 
citizen or alien, is an educated public. 
McCormick, supra note 45, at 160 (quoting Medical Examination of Aliens, 56 Fed. Reg. 
2485 (1991)). 
50. House Republicans sent a letter to Sullivan, signed by fifty-seven representatives, 
urging him to reconsider the proposed rule. Additionally, the HHS received more than 
40,000 letters opposing the proposed rule, many from conservative religious groups. In re­
sponse to this backlash, the Justice Department tabled the proposal. Barta, supra note 2, at 
329-30. 
51 .  Philip J. Hilts, Clinton to Lift Ban on H.J. V.-Infected Visitors, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 
1993, at A17. See also Barta, supra note 2, at 335. 
52. Pub. L. No. 103-43, 107 Stat. 210 (1993). The amendment was proposed by Republi­
can Senator Don Nickles. 
53. See 139 CONG. REC. 2,850 (1993) (remarks of Sen. Kassebaum) ("[M]y concern lies 
in the area of potential financial costs to an already beleaguered American health system . . . .  
[A] single AIDS case is currently estimated to cost about $102,000 over the lifetime of the 
patient."). Senator Phil Gramm clarified that the issue was one of fiscal responsibility, not 
one of compassion: "First, compassion is what you do with your money, not what you do 
with the taxpayers' money; and second, compassion ought to begin at home." 139 CONG. 
REC. 2,861 (1993) (remarks of Sen. Gramm). 
54. One prominent example came from Republican Senator Don Nickles of Oklahoma: 
"HIV persons will be flocking to the United States to have taxpayers pick up their health 
care expenses." What Insanity Could Persuade the United States of America to Admit to Its 
Shores Immigrants Testing Positive to HIV, the AIDS Virus?, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Feb. 14, 
1993, at 10, available at 1993 WL 7973345. 
55. See National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act of 1993, 139 CONG. REC. 3,016 
(1993) (statement of Sen. Hatfield): 
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The supporters of the HIV exclusion were also concerned with 
protecting the health of American citizens, although these concerns 
seem somewhat secondary to financial concerns.56 Moreover, these 
appeals to public health concerns were undermined by the medical 
experts' opinion that HIV does not fit the definition of a "communi­
cable disease of public health significance" under the 1990 
Immigration Act, because it is not spread through casual contact and 
does not put people in public settings at risk.57 Ultimately, the opposi­
tion to the amendment from some Democrats, health care providers, 
the scientific community, and AIDS advocacy groups was not enough 
to ensure its defeat, and the amendment was adopted.58 
The primacy of the legislators' financial concern in passing the 
HIV exclusion is evident in the waiver of the HIV exclusion available 
for general immigrants under the INA. This waiver admits HIV­
positive immigrants who have a close family relative who is a United 
States citizen or permanent resident.59 The familial connection has 
nothing to do with the public health risks posed by the HIV-positive 
applicant, but it is relevant to the likelihood that the applicant will not 
become a public charge if he has relatives to help finance his medical 
bills. The focus on financial concerns in the general waiver gives rise to 
I voted to oppose the Nickles amendment [which codified the HIV exclusion] today because 
I felt it attempted to make a medical decision for economic reasons. I do not believe Con­
gress is the proper authority for making medically and scientifically based decisions of this 
nature. The current public charge exclusions more appropriately address the economic con­
cerns and provide immigration officials with the basis for excluding those they believe will 
become public charges due to their medical conditions. If Congress is truly concerned with 
the economic costs associated with new immigrants, I feel it would be more appropriate to 
take a closer look at the public charge exclusions, rather than making medical decisions for 
political reasons. 
139 CONG. REC. 2,855 (1993) (statement of the National Commission on Acquired Immune 
Deficiency Syndrome, Washington, DC) ("Public charge provisions of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act require all applicants for immigrant and non-immigrant visas to demonstrate 
that they are not likely to become public charges. Anyone who does not do so is denied a 
visa and precluded from either visiting or immigrating to the United States."). 
56. As Senator Simpson noted, "[HIV] is certainly a contagious disease whose only 
prognosis as far as we know - and it is a terrible tragedy - is death, and [it] already affects 
1.5 million Americans." But he then went on to characterize the "public significance" of 
HIV in terms of medical care expenses: "[A] disease, which has such high medical costs, has 
to be of public health significance unless one would argue that health care costs are not of 
public health significance." This focus on the high cost of treating HIV indicates that, in 
Senator Simpson's opinion, the public health significance of HIV was bound up with its eco­
nomic significance. 139 CONG. REC. 2,870 (remarks of Sen. Simpson). 
57. These medical experts, from organizations including the Centers for Disease Control 
and Health and Human Services, concluded that HIV is "not spread by casual contact, 
through the air, or from food, water or other objects, nor will an infected person in a com­
mon public setting place another individual inadvertently or unwillingly at risk." 139 CONG. 
REC. 2,854 (1993) (news release from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 
Jan. 25, 1991). 
58. The final vote tally was 76 to 23. 139 CONG. REC. 3,016 (1993). 
59. 8 u.s.c. § 1182(g) (2000). 
November 2000] Exclusion of HIV-Positive Immigrants 467 
an inference about which waiver Congress intended for HIV-positive 
applicants under NACARA and HRIF A. In these Acts, Congress ex­
plicitly waived the public charge exclusion, sending a message that ap­
plicants should be admitted under these special statutes regardless of 
the possibility of their becoming a public charge.(j() Congress must have 
known that applicants were likely to fall under the public charge ex­
clusion given the economic and political conditions from which they 
fled.61 The waiver of the public charge exclusion demonstrates that 
Congress believed that the purpose of the Acts overshadowed its fiscal 
concerns. Thus, taking the inference one step further, Congress im­
plicitly prioritized the humanitarian and foreign policy purposes of 
NACARA and HRIFA over the primarily fiscal purpose of the HIV 
exclusion.62 Although Congress probably did not intend to waive the 
exclusion entirely, the INS should have looked to the legislative pur­
pose behind the HIV exclusion and the public charge waiver within 
HRIF A and NA CARA to inform its choice between HIV waivers. 
Because the INS did not consider the purpose of the HIV exclusion, 
which is relevant under both prongs of Chevron, its regulations are 
contrary to legislative intent and thus an abuse of discretion. 
Another relevant factor in the legislative history of the 1993 
amendment codifying the HIV exclusion is Congress's intent to treat 
HIV-positive refugees differently than other HIV-positive immi­
grants.63 In the debates over the amendment, the Senate discussed the 
60. See Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. 
L. No. 105-277, Title IX (Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 1998), 1 12 Stat. 2681, 
2681-583 (1998); Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act, District of Co­
lumbia Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-100, Title II (Nicaraguan Adjustment and Cen­
tral American Relief Act), tit. III, 111  Stat. 2160, 2193 (1997) (amended by Pub. L. No. 105-
139, 111 Stat. 2644 (1997)). 
61. See, e.g., Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act, Hearing before the Subcomm. 
on Immigration of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 10 (1997) (letter to Sen. 
Abraham from Alfonso Oviedo-Reyes, Attorney, Nicaraguan Fraternity) ("As you are 
aware, Haiti has a fragile economy and it is recovering from the devastating effects of a civil 
struggle that required the U.S. to send troops to Haiti in order to bring stability and guaran­
tee the rights of the Haitian citizens."); see also DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1998, s. PRT. 106-23, at 658 (1999) (Haiti) ("Haiti is an ex­
tremely poor country, with a per capita annual income of about $500 . . . .  About two-thirds 
of the population work in subsistence agriculture, earn less than the average income, and live 
in extreme poverty. A small, traditional elite controls much of the country's wealth."); DEP'T 
OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1997, 105 CONG., at 
591 (Nicaragua) (1998) ("Nicaragua is an extremely poor country . . . .  The unemployment 
rate was officially estimated at 14 percent, with underemployment reaching 35 percent."); 
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 1997 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES for 1997, 
105 CONG., at 481 (Cuba) (1998) ("[T]he economy remained depressed due to the inefficien­
cies of the centrally controlled economic system."). 
62. See infra Section 11.B. 
63. Under the international refugee definition in the 1951 Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 6261, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 152, a refugee is an 
individual who, "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, relig­
ion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the 
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situation of HIV-positive refugees as distinct from other immigrants. 
Statements by several Senators signify a recognition that the HIV ex­
clusion is not absolute, but must yield to other, greater concerns such 
as the plight of refugees.64 Comments from members of Congress indi­
cate that Congress did not intend to include refugees and other special 
immigrants within the blanket HIV exclusion, but intended for the 
waiver for humanitarian purposes under the Refugee Act of 1980 to 
remain intact.65 The ideas in these statements can be extended by 
analogy to HRIF A and NA CARA, because as Sections Il.B and 111.B 
discuss, Congress enacted the Acts in order to grant quasi-refugee 
remedies to Haitian, Nicaraguan, and Cuban immigrants who, like 
refugees, fled inhumane conditions. 
B. Legislative Intent Behind NACARA and HR/FA 
Under Chevron, courts look to the legislative history of statutes to 
determine whether the history clarifies Congress's intent under the 
"holistic" method of statutory construction of Chevron prong one66 
and, if Congress's intent is not clear, to ascertain Congress's purposes 
to decide whether the agency's regulation was unreasonable under 
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of 
the protection of that country . . . .  " The United States signed on to the treaty, adopting the 
definition, in the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. See Protocol Relating to 
the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 6225, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, 268. The treaty 
requires special treatment of individuals who meet the refugee definition. 
64. Senator Simpson pointed out that refugees were not subject to the HIV exclusion: 
"This amendment does not affect refugees who are admitted under another provision which 
allows waivers of medical exclusion." 139 CONG. REC. 2,871 (1993) (remarks of Sen. 
Simpson). This statement is not completely true, because the Refugee Act specifies that 
refugees and asylees are still subject to the HIV exclusion, although they can apply for a 
waiver based on humanitarian purposes and the public interest. See infra Section 111.B. 
Interestingly, this debate took place at a time when over 200 HIV-positive Haitians who 
had fled their country were being detained in a quarantined camp in Guatanamo Bay. Sev­
eral Senators expressed concern about these people being allowed to come to the United 
States. But as Senator Simpson pointed out, these Haitians did not meet the definition of 
refugee anyway, because many of them fled for primarily economic reasons. Additionally, 
the detainees can be distinguished from HRIF A applicants because they were outside the 
United States and these debates took place before HRIFA was enacted. The comments are 
interesting, however, because they reveal a commonly held belief that a substantial percent­
age of Haitians are HIV-positive. See 139 CONG. REC. 2,860 (1993) (remarks of Sen. 
Nickles) ("I have heard reports that in Haiti alone, the HIV population may range as much 
as 11 percent, and that is a tragedy."). 
65. Senator Bob Dole, discussing the waiver authority of the Attorney General, af­
firmed that "[n]o one has argued that this waiver authority should be altered." 139 CONG. 
REC. 2,866 (remarks of Sen. Dole). See supra note 64 (remarks of Sen. Simpson concerning 
the HIV waiver for refugees). 
66. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res., Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 851-53 (1984) (looking 
to the legislative history of the Clean Air Act to see if Congress's intent was clear on the is­
sue); see also Scalia, supra note 19, at 515 ("[I]t seems to me that the 'traditional tools of 
statutory construction' include not merely text and legislative history but also, quite specifi­
cally, the consideration of policy consequences."). 
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Chevron prong two.67 Explicit discussion of the waiver of the HIV ex­
clusion in the legislative history is not necessary to ascertain 
Congress's clear intent under Chevron prong one. Even if this failure 
to discuss the precise issue renders the legislative history unclear un­
der the first prong of Chevron, the legislative history sheds light on 
Congress's purposes to the extent necessary to determine that the 
INS's interpretation of that intent in its regulations was unreasonable 
under Chevron prong two. 
Congress intended NA CARA and HRIF A to provide permanent 
immigration relief to Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Cubans fleeing hor­
rific situations in their home countries. This section discusses the leg­
islative history of the Acts, which demonstrates Congress's humani­
tarian purpose. The legislative history of the Acts is relatively scant, as 
NACARA was never referred to or discussed in a committee, and 
both Acts were eventually passed within large appropriations bills. 
But there are enough sources of legislative history to understand 
Congress's purposes and policy reasons for enacting NACARA and 
HRIF A, including a Senate Explanatory Memorandum, floor testi­
mony from the House and Senate debates of NACARA, and a Senate 
immigration subcommittee hearing on HRIFA.68 Like the Acts them­
selves, none of the legislative history touches on the HIV exclusion is­
sue or the available waivers of the exclusion from which the INS might 
choose. Nonetheless, the INS had a duty to recognize the humanitar­
ian purpose demonstrated in the legislative history, and it should have 
chosen the less restrictive humanitarian waiver of the HIV exclusion. 
The humanitarian waiver, which takes into consideration humanitar­
ian reasons to refrain from sending the HIV-positive applicant back to 
his home country, is more appropriate, given that the Acts were based 
on an understanding that there are, in fact, humanitarian reasons to 
allow these refugees to stay in the United States permanently. This 
section concludes that under both prongs of 
Chevron, the INS had a duty to recognize Congress's humanitarian in­
tent in adopting the Acts and to choose the waiver of the HIV exclu­
sion that would better further Congress's goals. 
67. See Cont'! Airlines v. Dep't of Transp., 843 F.2d 1444, 1449 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("In our 
view, reasonableness in this context is to be determined by reference both to the agency's 
textual analysis (broadly defined, including where appropriate resort to legislative history) 
and to the compatibility of that interpretation with the Congressional purposes informing 
the measure."). 
68. Both of these documents are appropriate for ascertaining congressional intent. Al­
though Committee Reports are generally considered the most authoritative source of legisla­
tive intent, committee hearings are considered useful, particularly for insight into Congress's 
purpose. Likewise, statements in floor debate, particularly when made by the bill's sponsor, 
are indicative of legislative intent. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, CASES 
AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 709-10, 717-19 (2d ed. 1995); see also Trbovich v. United 
Mine Workers of Am., 404 U.S. 528 (1972) (construing the statute by relying almost entirely 
on statements at Senate hearings by Senator John Kennedy, the bill's sponsor, and his advi­
sor). 
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Because NACARA was enacted approximately ten months prior 
to HRIFA and HRIFA's language was modeled on NACARA, it is 
appropriate to look first to the legislative history of NACARA. The 
purposes of the bill, as reported in the Explanatory Memorandum re­
printed in the Congressional Record, were as follows: 
The purpose of this Act is to ensure that nationals of certain specified 
countries who fled civil wars and other upheavals in their home countries 
and sought refuge in the United States, as well as designated family 
members, are accorded a fair and equitable opportunity to demonstrate 
that, under the legal standards established by this Act, they should be 
permitted to remain, and pursue permanent resident status, in the 
United States. In recognition of the hardship that those eligible for relief 
suffered in fleeing their homelands and the delays and uncertainty that 
they have experienced in pursuing legal status in the United States, the 
Congress directs the Department of Justice and the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service to adjudicate applications for relief under this Act 
expeditiously and humanely.69 
This statement of purpose indicates that NACARA was a humanitar­
ian measure, intended to give immigrants who fled inhumane situa­
tions permanent immigration relief in the United States. The House 
floor debates on NACARA support this purpose as well.70 Addition­
ally, Congress specifically directed the INS to adjudicate NACARA 
applications "humanely."71 The humanitarian waiver of the HIV ex­
clusion would have effectuated this mandate, because the waiver re­
quires the Attorney General to determine whether there are humani­
tarian reasons for the INS not to send the applicant back to his home 
country. Congress's statement of purpose recognizes the existence of 
such humanitarian reasons, and the INS should have followed 
Congress's guidance. 
A secondary purpose behind NACARA was administrative con­
venience. The statement above mentioned the delays that NACARA 
applicants had faced in the processing of their asylum cases, and this 
concern was reiterated at other points of the legislative history as 
well.72 The concern is a legitimate one; asylum cases require an exten-
69. EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM REGARDING TITLE II OF THE D.C. 
APPROPRIATIONS PORTION OF THE OMNIBUS APPROPRIATIONS BILL SUBMITTED BY 
MESSRS. MACK, GRAHAM, ABRAHAM, KENNEDY, AND DURBIN, reprinted in 143 CONG. 
REC. Sl2266 (daily ed. Nov. 9, 1997) [hereinafter EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM) . 
70. See District of Columbia Appropriations Act, 143 CONG. REC. Hl0,678 (daily ed. 
Nov. 12, 1997) (statement of Rep. Davis) ("The inclusion of this legislation in the D.C. ap­
propriation bill will bring a measure of justice to thousands who have fled oppression in their 
native land to seek the freedom and opportunity offered in this Nation."). 
71. See EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM, supra note 69, at Sl2266. 
72. See, e.g., EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM, supra note 69, at S12267 ("[A)pplication 
of the foregoing approach would greatly reduce the need for protracted analysis of the more 
subjective aspects of the suspension [of deportation) standard, thereby reducing the adminis-
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sive individualized assessment, which is expensive and leaves appli­
cants without status as they wait for a resolution.73 But it is notable 
that Congress's solution to the administrative problem was to allow all 
Nicaraguans and Cubans who had been in the United States since 1995 
to become permanent residents, regardless of their potential cost to 
society or the likelihood of success in their asylum claims. The solution 
Congress chose to the administrative problem indicates that it was 
more concerned about providing a quick, permanent resolution and 
removing barriers to immigration relief than saving money. 
The Senate Immigration Subcommittee hearing on HRIF A indi­
cates that Congress was motivated by similar humanitarian concerns 
when it passed HRIF A almost a year later. As when enacting 
NACARA, Congress was concerned, especially in light of the harsh 
deportation requirements enacted in 1996 in the Illegal Immigrant Re­
form and Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA"), that Haitians 
who resided in the United States with temporary status might be de­
ported. Senator Spencer Abraham, Chairman of the Senate Immigra­
tion Subcommittee, elaborated on these concerns in his opening re­
marks: 
In recent years, many people came to the United States under a legal or 
quasi-legal status, fleeing tyrannical regimes that were either enemies of 
the United States or allies whose domestic abuses were countenanced 
because of the country's strategic significance in the struggles for world 
freedom that were going on at the time. I noted during the (NACARA) 
debates that retroactive application of the new standards would likely 
force some of these people to leave, despite the roots they have laid 
down, and the fact that the conditions they were returning to remained 
dangerous.74 
Senator Abraham's remarks indicate that Congress was motivated by 
an unwillingness to send Haitians back to the dangerous situations 
they fled in Haiti. As with NACARA, the HIV waiver available to 
applicants who could demonstrate that there were humanitarian rea­
sons not to send them home would be more appropriate to fulfill 
Congress's purpose. 
Congress had another purpose in enacting HRIF A that was not 
present in NACARA: ensuring that Haitian immigrants were treated 
trative burden on the Immigration and Naturalization Service and minimizing further delays 
in according relief to these individuals."). 
73. See, e.g., Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Immigration of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 19 (1997) (statement of 
Rep. Dfaz-Balart) ("[T]hese refugees filed asylum petitions, oftentimes during lengthy proc­
essing times, for Immigration to evaluate their claims . . . .  It is estimated that approximately 
4,000 of these asylum claims are still pending."). 
74. Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immi­
gration, of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 2-3 (1997) (statement of Sen. 
Abraham). 
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fairly by U.S. immigration laws. Members of Congress were acutely 
aware of the historic disparate treatment of Haitian refugees in com­
parison to other similar groups, most prominently Cubans.75 In light of 
the passage of NACARA, members of the Congressional Black 
Caucus convinced other members of Congress and President Clinton 
that U.S. immigration law should treat similarly situated refugees the 
same.76 The legislative history of HRIF A indicates that Congress was 
in fact motivated in part by the lack of consistent treatment of refu­
gees.77 This secondary motive is relevant to the HIV waiver question 
because it indicates that Congress chose to provide widespread immi­
gration relief to Haitians through HRIF A, which it had consistently 
failed to do previously, so the more lenient HIV waiver is appropriate 
to fulfill Congress's intent. 
75. In 1994, Representative Carrie Meek proposed a Haitian Refugee Fairness Act that 
would have provided Temporary Protected Status to Haitians, thereby relieving the "unfair­
ness, inequity and the perception of racial prejudice" that characterized U.S. policy toward 
Haitian refugees and asylees. U.S. Policy Toward Haiti: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Western Hemisphere and Peace Corps Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 
103rd Cong. 7 (1994) (testimony of Rep. Meek). Representative Corrinne Brown agreed: 
"For too long, Haitian refugees have been treated differently from other refugees, particu­
larly Cuban refugees." Haitian Asylum-Seekers: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Interna­
tional Law, Immigration and Refugees of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103rd Cong. 68 
(1994) (statement of Rep. Brown). Although this bill was not passed, it was a precursor to 
the Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 1998, which was founded upon the princi­
ple of providing the same humanitarian relief to similarly situated refugees. 
76. When Congress enacted NACARA in 1997, President Clinton - under pressure 
from the Congressional Black Caucus and other groups - finally recognized this prejudice 
by ordering a policy of Deferred Enforced Departure, which protected Haitians from depor­
tation until legislation comparable to NACARA could be passed. See Clinton Orders De­
ferred Enforced Departure for Haitians, 75 INTERPRETER RELEASES 2 (1998) ("Like Central 
Americans, Haitians for many years were forced to seek the protection of the United States 
because of oppression, human rights abuses and civil strife at home . . . .  [w]hile we have been 
encouraged by Haiti's progress following the restoration of democratic government in 1994, 
the situation there remains fragile.") (quoting President Clinton). See, e.g., Haitian Refugee 
Immigration Fairness Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration of the Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 3 (1997) (statement of Sen. Abraham) ("U.S. immigra­
tion law, in my judgment, should not turn on arbitrary distinctions between members of dif­
ferent nationalities."); see also Annette C. Escobar, Note and Comment, Aggravating the 
Immigration Paradox: The Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act's Effect 
on U.S. Immigration Policy, 11 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 445, 473-74 (1999) (discussing Con­
gress's acknowledgment that NACARA inherently discriminated against Haitians). 
77. As stated by Senator Kennedy: 
[Haitians] endured repression and suffered persecution at the hands of successive govern­
ments. Haitians supporting democracy have faced torture, extra-judicial killings, imprison­
ment, and other forms of persecution . . . .  The call for democracy is being heard around the 
world, and America's voice has always been the loudest. How can we advocate democracy 
on the one hand, and then deny protection to those who heed our call and are forced to flee 
their homeland as a result? 
144 CONG. REC. S13003 (daily ed. Nov. 12, 1998) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). See Haitian 
Refugee Immigration Fairness Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration of the Sen­
ate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 14-15 (1997) (statement of Rep. Conyers) (discuss­
ing the inequity to Haitian refugees in NACARA and in the history of U.S. immigration 
law's treatment of Haitian refugees in general); id. at 38-40 (statement of Miraan Sa, Am­
nesty International) (discussing the ongoing human rights abuses in Haiti). 
November 2000] Exclusion of HW-Positive Immigrants 473 
The historical context of the United States' immigration policies 
toward and relationships with Nicaragua, Haiti, and Cuba indicates 
that Congress also had foreign policy reasons for enacting NACARA 
and HRIF A.78 In addition to the legislative purposes discussed above, 
NACARA and HRIFA represent congressional decisions to provide 
special relief above and beyond what is normally available through 
United States immigration policy - a recurring theme in diplomatic 
relations with these countries. Congress singled out Haitians, Cubans, 
and Nicaraguans for preferential immigration treatment to compen­
sate for the United States' involvement in - and in some cases, re­
sponsibility for - the political situations in these countries.79 
NACARA is a continuation of the United States' scheme of spe­
cial immigration protection for Cubans over the past several decades 
and a reiteration of American disapproval of Communism. The 
United States has used immigration policy as a political tool to fight 
Communism in Cuba since the Cuban Revolution of 1959 caused a 
mass emmigration to the United States.80 Because it viewed the Com­
munist regime under Fidel Castro as inherently abhorrent and oppres­
sive, the United States was (and is) reluctant to return anyone to such 
conditions.81 Coupled with this anti-Communist motive is a humani-
78. As Senator Kennedy pointed out, "President Clinton and Secretary Albright have 
repeatedly stated that it is America's long-standing foreign policy to ensure the continuing 
stability and viability of emerging, yet still fragile, democracies in Central America and 
Haiti." 145 CONG. REC. Sl0,946 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1999) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy) (dis­
cussing not the Acts at issue in this Note but the proposed Central American and Haitian 
Parity Act, which would amend the Acts discussed here). 
79. See Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Immigration of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 2-3 (1997) (statement of Sen. 
Abraham) ("In recent years, many people came to the United States under a legal or quasi­
legal status, fleeing tyrannical regimes that were either enemies of the United States or allies 
whose domestic abuses were countenanced because of the country's strategic significance in 
the struggles for world freedom that were going on at the time."). Indeed, as Michael Walzer 
observed, a government feels the most obligation to assist refugees in two situations: when it 
has helped to turn the individuals into refugees by direct involvement in the unrest that has 
uprooted them, and when the individuals are persecuted precisely because they are ideologi­
cally and/or ethnically similar to its own citizens. MICHAEL w ALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 
49 (1983). 
80. Travieso-Diaz, supra note 11 ,  at 251 ("U.S. policy toward Cuba in the last forty years 
has been motivated exclusively by the interest of the United States in fighting Communism 
and replacing the current Cuban government with a democratic regime."). 
81. See The Clinton Administration's Reversal of United States Immigration Policy To­
ward Cuba, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Western Hemisphere of the House Comm. 
on International Relations, 104th Cong. 1 (1995) (comments of Chairman Dan Burton): 
For over 30 years, the United States has had a policy of accepting people who are fleeing 
Communist oppression from the island of Cuba. The oppressive policies of the Castro re­
gime are known around the world. Not only has Fidel Castro supported violent revolution 
around our hemisphere, but he also has assisted in revolutionary organizations in Africa, the 
Middle East, and elsewhere. 
The recent international custody battle over 6-year old Elian Gonzalez, who fled Cuba and 
was rescued in the high seas and brought to America in late 1999, highlighted the fact that 
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tarian concern about human rights conditions in Cuba.82 Congress 
codified this sentiment in the Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act of 1966, 
which allowed Cubans who were paroled into the United States to 
adjust their status to lawful permanent resident after two years, with­
out having to surmount the barriers of proving their eligibility for 
asylum.83 In fact, the Senate explained that NACARA was modeled 
after the Cuban Adjustment Act.84 Cuban refugees continue to receive 
special immigration treatment in contrast to other refugees, most no­
tably Haitians.85 
The United States' immigration remedies for Nicaraguan refugees, 
including NACARA, grew out of a sense of obligation resulting from 
American involvement in the civil war between the Contras and the 
Sandanistas in the 1980s, which drained the Nicaraguan economy and 
compelled citizens to seek refuge.86 Congress responded with various 
U.S.-Cuba immigration policy is really about the eternal political disagreement between 
communism and democracy. See Joseph Contreras, The War Over Elian, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 
17, 2000, at 22-25. 
82. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 105 
CONG., at 481 (Cuba) (1997) ("The (Cuban] Government's human rights record remained 
poor. It continued systematically to violate fundamental civil and political rights of its citi­
zens."). 
83. Cuban Refugees, Adjustment of Status, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1 161 (1966). See 
Travieso-Diaz, supra note 11 ,  at 239 n.20 ("Congress in effect decided that because Castro 
was Communist, in general no Cubans should be deported."). The administration adhered to 
this open door policy even during the infamous Mariel boatlifts of 1980, when approximately 
125,000 Cubans fled subsequent to Castro's removal of the exit restrictions at the Mariel 
port. See id. at 242. In April 1996, the Senate voted to keep the Cuban Refugee Adjustment 
Act intact until Cuba has a democratic government, at which point it will be repealed. See id. 
at 250. Haitians have pointed to this open-ended law as evidence of U.S. immigration pol­
icy's differential treatment of Haitians and Cubans. See Cheryl Little, Intergroup Coalitions 
and Immigration Policies: The Haitian Experience in Florida, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 717, 733 
(1999) ("The Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act . . .  accounts in large measure for the stark 
difference in treatment between the two groups. But what makes this law so remarkable is 
that it is open-ended, has no cut-off date, and has not been repealed."). 
84. See EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM REGARDING TITLE II OF THE D.C. 
APPROPRIATIONS PORTION OF THE OMNIBUS APPROPRIATIONS BILL SUBMITTED BY 
MESSRS. MACK, GRAHAM, ABRAHAM, KENNEDY, AND DURBIN, reprinted in 143 CONG. 
REC. S12266 (daily ed. Nov. 9, 1997). 
85. See, e.g., The Clinton Administration's Reversal of United States Immigration Policy 
toward Cuba, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Western Hemisphere of the House Comm. 
on International Relations, 104th Cong. 2 (1995) (comments of Chairman Dan Burton). Con­
trasting Cuban refugees to economic refugees, the Chairman stated: 
Now we are confusing people who are fleeing oppression from Castro's Cuba with people 
who are coming here for economic reasons . . . .  The people who are coming here for eco­
nomic reasons from Mexico and elsewhere are not coming because they are fleeing oppres­
sion, but rather they are coming here to make a living and we have a terrible problem with 
that. However, those who are fleeing for their lives, those who are fleeing to bring their 
families to safety out of the horrible conditions that exist in Cuba because of the Communist 
terror down there, those who do not want to be thrown into Castro's dungeons, have a right 
to be free. 
86. Approximately 126,000 Nicaraguans applied for asylum in the United States be­
tween 1981 and 1991: "What happened when these various people came to our country was 
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special immigration measures, but because none of them provided the 
permanent immigration relief that NACARA provided, Nicaraguans 
were left in an in-between status - neither permanent residents nor 
illegal aliens.s7 When Congress passed IIRIRA in 1996 and the INS 
began to apply its deportation provisions retroactively, Nicaraguans 
under these programs were in danger of deportation.ss Congress 
solved this quandary by enacting NACARA, which provided the per­
manent solution necessary to avoid deporting these Nicaraguans and 
thus maintain consistency in its policy of providing humanitarian relief 
to Nicaraguan refugees.s9 Congress intended NACARA to provide 
somewhat different than what happened to others who have come here . . . .  Indeed, the ac­
tions with regard to the Nicaraguans in particular suggests that the American Government 
was actively promoting the notion that those Nicaraguans, fearful of the outcome of these 
uprisings, come to America." 143 CONG. REC. Sl0,199 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1997) (statement 
of Sen. Abraham). 
87. These legislative responses began with the Nicaraguan Review Program from 1985 
to 1995, which temporarily protected Nicaraguan asylum applicants from deportation while 
their asylum cases were under review and allowed rejected asylum-seekers to reapply for 
asylum instead of being deported. This reapplication provision essentially allowed 
Nicaraguan asylum-seekers an extra level of review. See PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO 
CONGRESS TRANSMITTING A LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL TO PROVIDE RELIEF TO CERTAIN 
ALIENS WHO WOULD OTHERWISE BE SUBJECT TO REMOVAL FROM THE UNITED STATES, 
H.R. Doc. No. 105-111, at 1-2; see also 143 CONG. REC. Sl0,199 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1997); 
Linda Kelly, Defying Membership: The Evolving Role of Immigration Jurisprudence, 67 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 185, 224 (1998). When the program expired in 1995, the INS encouraged Nica­
raguans to apply for suspension of deportation, which was available to aliens who had lived 
continuously in the United States for seven years. See id. at 225. 
88. IIRIRA replaced suspension of deportation with the more restrictive cancellation of 
removal. Cancellation generally requires the applicant to demonstrate: 1) ten years of physi­
cal presence in the United States; 2) good moral character during that time; 3) no convic­
tions of certain crimes, including crimes "involving moral turpitude"; and 4) "exceptional 
and extremely unusual" hardship not to the applicant, but to a U.S. citizen or permanent 
resident spouse, parent, or child of the applicant. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l) (Supp. V 1999). 
This retroactive application of IIRIRA and the problems it caused for Nicaraguans was the 
subject of a class-action suit in a Florida district court. See Tefel v. Reno, 972 F. Supp. 623, 
650 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (granting preliminary injunction that prevented the INS from deporting 
any of the class members or dismissing their applications for suspension of deportation). 
This preliminary injunction was vacated and the case remanded by the Eleventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals in response to the enactment of NACARA, which rendered many of the 
class members' claims moot by allowing Nicaraguans to bypass the suspension of deporta­
tion process and apply for adjustment to permanent resident status. See Tefel, 180 F.3d at 
1293-94; see also Kelly, supra note 87, at 226-27 (discussing the impact of the Tefel case on 
legislators' decisions regarding NACARA). 
89. Members of the Senate discussed the impact of IIRIRA on Nicaraguans in their 
consideration of NACARA. See 143 CONG. REC. Sl0,196-202 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1997). 
Senator Abraham summarized the need for consistency in the United States' policy toward 
Nicaragua: 
[I]n the 1980's, this country actively encouraged people fearing persecution, fearing death 
squads, fearing disruptions of their communities to come to America. Then we took extraor­
dinary measures to make it feasible for them to stay here, even those who had been denied 
asylum through the official asylum-seeking procedures . . . .  
143 CONG. REC. Sl0,199-200 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1997). Senator Mack reiterated Senator 
Abraham's consistency concerns: 
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widespread relief to refugees fleeing a political situation in which the 
United States was directly involved. 
United States involvement in Haiti in the past decade has primarily 
focused on promoting democracy, but this focus has not been as acute 
as the obsession with defeating Communism in Cuba.90 When a mili­
tary coup cut short the democratically-elected regime of Jean­
Bertrand Aristide in September 1991, Haitian citizens fled the vio­
lence and poverty that ensued.91 Congress's solution - interception of 
Haitians at sea and return to Haiti - although congruent with the 
United States' historical treatment of Haitians, differed markedly 
from its policy toward Cuban refugees.92 In May 1994, President 
Clinton temporarily suspended this direct return policy and instituted 
a policy of transporting intercepted refugees to a safe haven on 
Guatanamo Bay for processing of their asylum claims.93 But this policy 
[I]n essence, we went to bat for [the Central American refugees] in the 1980's to protect de­
mocracy and to move them toward freedom and capitalism, and today [they] are still strug­
gling in that battle. To send several hundred thousand individuals back into an environ­
ment . . .  where the unemployment rate is 60 percent, would destabilize those countries, 
which would be just the opposite of the effort that we made in the 1980's. 
143 CONG. REC. Sl0,201 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1997) (statement of Sen. Mack). 
Senator Abraham emphasized this concern again during the hearings on HRIFA: 
Unfortunately, various sections of [IIRIRA] . . .  have had some perverse impacts on a vari­
ety of different fronts that have been, as a consequence, issues to be addressed by those of us 
in the 105th Congress. The combination of the changes to the suspension of deportation pro­
cedures and the cap of 4,000 per year on those who could be suspended and adjusted, was 
together a very devastating set of procedures with regard to people who had been in various 
processes seeking to have their status adjusted here in the United States. 
Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act: Hearing Before the Senate Subcomm. On Immi­
gration of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 2 (1997) (statement of Sen. Abraham). 
90. See Malissia Lennox, Note, Refugees, Racism, and Reparations: A Critique of the 
United States' Haitian Immigration Policy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 687, 710-14 (1993) (distin­
guishing U.S. treatment of Cuban and Haitian asylum-seekers based on the political bent of 
their home countries). As Lennox notes, the United States is more likely to grant asylum to 
people fleeing Communist regimes: "Even today, 90 percent of asylees hail from communist 
countries." Id. at 711 (citation omitted). 
91. Congress considered this election "the most free and fair elections in [Haitian) his­
tory." U.S. Policy Toward Haiti: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Western Hemisphere and 
Peace Corps Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 103rd Cong. 1 (1994) (state­
ment of Chairman Christopher Dodd). See Elizabeth Kay Harris, Economic Refugees: Un­
protected in the United States by Virtue of an Inaccurate Label, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 
269, 279 (1993). As Harris discusses, Haitian civilians were subject to unemployment, starva­
tion, and constant fear of attack, as "economic conditions become inseparable from political 
conditions." Id. at 282. 
92. From 1981 to 1991, U.S. policy toward Haitian refugees consisted of using the Coast 
Guard to prevent them from reaching the United States. See Lennox, supra note 90, at 703-
04. After the 1991 coup, the administration introduced a parole process, whereby Haitians 
were intercepted at sea and interviewed at Guatanamo Bay. Those who met the threshold 
"credible fear" standard for asylum claims were temporary paroled into the United States to 
apply for asylum. See 143 CONG. REC. E2,382 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (extension of re­
marks of Rep. Conyers). 
93. See Susan Martin, Andy Schoenholtz, and Deborah Waller Meyers, Temporary 
Protection: Towards a New Regional and Domestic Framework, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 543, 
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was short-lived: after U.S. troops returned Aristide to power in 
October of 1994, the U.S. government sent the Haitians in Guatanamo 
Bay refugee camps back to their homeland, even though members of 
the military continued to make Haiti unsafe for Aristide supporters.94 
As discussed above, HRIF A represents Congress's acknowledgment 
that U.S. immigration policy for Haitians was inconsistent with the 
policy for Cubans, given that Congress had similar foreign policy con­
cerns about both neighboring countries. 
This discussion of the United States' involvement and interest in 
Cuba, Nicaragua, and Haiti supports the evidence of legislative intent 
found in the legislative history of the Acts. The United States has a 
long history of involvement in the political regimes of these countries, 
and feels a sense of obligation to its political allies who fled these abu­
sive regimes. Congress, recognizing the inhumane circumstances 
HRIF A and NA CARA applicants fled and the unstable political con­
ditions in their home countries, intended the Acts to provide a com­
prehensive, humanitarian immigration solution. In addition, wide­
spread relief negated the need to evaluate each applicant's asylum 
claim individually. When these concerns are compared to the financial 
justification behind the HIV exclusion discussed in Section II.A, it 
seems that the humanitarian HIV waiver is more consistent with 
Congress's intent than the waiver based on familial ties to the United 
States. Because the INS did not heed Congress's purposes when 
choosing the proper HIV waiver under the Acts, its waiver regulations 
are both contrary to legislative intent under Chevron prong one and 
unreasonable under Chevron prong two, and thus an abuse of adminis­
trative discretion. 
554 (1998); STOTZKY, supra note 11 ,  at 37 (discussing Clinton's move as a response to politi­
cal pressure from the Congressional Black Caucus and human rights groups). Many of these 
people were paroled into the United States after immigration officials determined that they 
had a credible asylum claim. HRIFA granted these parolees permanent residence status, 
based on a recognition that their asylum claims might not be successful and, even if they 
were, might not provide a permanent remedy. See Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act: 
Hearing before the Subcomm. on Immigration of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th 
Cong. 19 (1997) (statement of Rep. Dfaz-Balart) (stating that of the approximately 11,000 
Haitians who were paroled through Guatanamo Bay between 1991 and 1993, 4,000 of their 
asylum claims are still pending). 
94. See Martin et al, supra note 93, at 555; STOTZKY, supra note 11 ,  at 39-41; see also 
U.S. Policy Toward Haiti: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Western Hemisphere and Peace 
Corps Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 103rd Cong. 63 (1994) (testimony 
of Holly Burkhalter, Advocacy Director, Human Rights Watch). Ms. Burkhalter discussed 
the state of human rights in Haiti in 1994: "Haitians remain in the relentless grip of the mili­
tary and armed thugs, who murder, attack, and harass suspected Aristide supporters with 
impunity." And although many Haitians sought relief through the U.S. refugee program, 
"the sea has proved safer for them than the U.S. Embassy's refugee program." Id. 
478 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 99:452 
III. COMPARING THE INS REGULATIONS UNDER NA CARA AND 
HRIF A TO OTHER IMMIGRATION LAWS 
A comparison of NA CARA and HRIF A to other immigration 
laws demonstrates that Congress intended the Acts to provide perma­
nent immigration relief analogous to that available under the Refugee 
Act and other special immigration laws contained within the INA. 
Special immigrants under these laws can apply for an HIV waiver for 
humanitarian reasons, unlike general immigrants, who must apply for 
the waiver based on family relationships. The INS chose the latter 
HIV waiver in its regulations for NA CARA and HRIF A, even though 
both waivers were available in the INA and Congress considered 
NACARA and HRIF A applicants to be more like special immigrants 
than general immigrants. Thus, the INS's HIV waiver is inconsistent 
with the structure of the INA as a whole and thereby contrary to leg­
islative intent. 
Looking to other immigration provisions within the INA is a le­
gitimate method to determine legislative intent under the holistic ap­
proach to statutory construction. As the Supreme Court advised in 
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co. , in determining legislative intent, congres­
sional acts "should not be read as a series of unrelated and isolated 
provisions."95 Other relevant statutes should be considered along with 
them in pari materia. 96 The Supreme Court recently employed this 
method in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. ,97 in which it 
invalidated the Food and Drug Administration's ("FDA") tobacco 
regulations. To ascertain legislative intent, the Court looked beyond 
the plain language of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA"), 
which granted the FDA authority to regulate drugs and devices, to 
other congressional statutes regulating the use of tobacco. The Court 
considered statutes enacted both prior to and subsequent to the en­
actment of the FDCA.98 Other immigration laws are relevant to 
NACARA and HRIFA under this analysis, because all of the laws are 
included within the INA and newly enacted laws are codified as 
95. 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995). 
96. Statutes that are "in pari materia" are "those relating to the same person or thing or 
having a common purpose." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 791 (6th ed. 1990). 
97. 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
98. Id. at 142-58. Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, summarized the Court's 
holding: 
In this case, we believe that Congress has clearly precluded the FDA from asserting jurisdic­
tion to regulate tobacco products. Such authority is inconsistent with the intent that Con­
gress has expressed in the FDCA's overall regulatory scheme and in the tobacco-specific 
legislation that it has enacted subsequent to the FDCA. In light of this clear intent, the 
FDA's assertion of jurisdiction is impermissible. 
Id. at 1297. 
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amendments of the INA.99 Even if these relevant statutes do not indi­
cate Congress's clear intent concerning the HIV waiver under Chev­
ron prong one, looking to other statutes is a valid method of discern­
ing the reasonableness of the INS's waiver policy under Chevron 
prong two. 
This Part utilizes the above method to determine the legislative in­
tent of NACARA and HRIF A by comparing the provisions and re­
quirements of the Acts with other immigration provisions. Section 
III.A contrasts the statutory requirements for adjustment of status to 
permanent resident under the Acts to the general requirements for 
immigrants who wish to adjust their status, concluding that, by delet­
ing many of the adjustment requirements for applicants under the 
Acts, Congress intended to make it easier for these Haitians, 
Nicaraguans, and Cubans to adjust their status to permanent resident. 
Section IIl.B compares the statutory and regulatory provisions for 
adjustment under the Acts with the provisions for refugee and asylum 
status, arguing that the INS's restrictive regulations for HIV-positive 
HRIF A and NACARA applicants contradict Congress's attempt to 
allow these Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Cubans to bypass the barriers 
to qualifying for asylum. Section 111.C analogizes the Acts to similar 
ad hoc legislation for immigrants from certain countries, concluding 
that because these laws are similar in purpose to NACARA and 
HRIF A, the INS should have looked to them to determine which 
waiver should be available for HIV-positive HRIFA and NACARA 
applicants. This Part concludes that, because Congress intended 
HRIF A and NACARA to provide permanent, widespread immigra­
tion relief that is more like refugee law and other special immigration 
measures than relief available to general immigrants, the INS should 
have imitated the HIV waiver available under special immigration 
laws rather than the one available under general immigration law. 
A. A djustment of Status for Immigrants Generally 
A comparison of the requirements and barriers to adjustment of 
status from immigrant to permanent resident in the INA with those in 
HRIF A and NA CARA demonstrates that Congress intended to allow 
applicants under the Acts to bypass many of the barriers to obtaining 
a "green card" that most immigrants face. General immigrants apply­
ing for permanent residence status must demonstrate that they have 
been inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States and 
must fit into one of the narrowly defined categories of eligibility de­
fined by the statute, of which all except immediate family relationships 
99. For instance, HRIFA and NACARA were codified as amendments to the adjust­
ment of status provision of the INA. 8 U.S.C. § 1255 note (Supp. V 1999). 
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are subject to annual numerical limitations. 100 In contrast, NACARA 
and HRIF A applicants can adjust their status without demonstrating 
that they were inspected, admitted, or paroled, which would be diffi­
cult for most of the applicants to prove; they must show only that they 
have resided in the United States since December 1995.101 In addition, 
NACARA and HRIFA are not subject to numerical quotas. 
More importantly, immigrants seeking adjustment of status under 
the general INA provision must be "eligible to receive an immigrant 
visa," which means that applicants are subject to all of the grounds for 
inadmissibility.102 In contrast, HRIFA and NACARA automatically 
waive many of these grounds, including the exclusion of aliens who are 
likely to become a public charge, aliens who have been working in the 
United States without authorization or wish to do so in the future, un­
documented aliens, and aliens who are unlawfully in the United 
States.103 The fact that Congress waived the public charge exclusion for 
HRIF A and NA CARA applicants indicates a recognition that most of 
the Haitian, Nicaraguan, and Cuban applicants were poor, having fled 
their poverty-stricken home countries without any of their belongings, 
and would either have to work or obtain public assistance at least 
100. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (1994); MARGARET H. MCCORMICK, The Immigration Sys­
tem, reprinted in IMMIGRATION LAW: BASICS AND MORE 5-9 (2000) (discussing the annual 
numerical limitations and four categories of eligibility for permanent residence: family rela­
tionship, employment relationship or circumstance, lottery based on diversity of country ori­
gin, and eligibility for special immigrant status (such as refugee status)). Although these re­
quirements may sound simple, they exclude many immigrants who would be included under 
HRIF A and NA CARA. For example, aliens who enter the United States illegally - without 
being inspected and admitted or paroled - are ineligible. Adjustment of Status to that of 
Person Admitted for Permanent Residence, 8 C.F.R. § 245.l(b)(3) (1999). 
101. District of Columbia Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-100, Title II (Nicaraguan 
Adjustment and Central American Relief Act) § 202(b)(2), 111  Stat. 2160, 2194 (1997); Om­
nibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 
Title IX (Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 1998), § 902(b)(l), 1 12 Stat. 2681, 
2681-538 (1998). 
102. 8 C.F.R. § 245.l(a) (1999). These grounds for exclusion include the HIV exclusion 
and are found in 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1994). 
103. See supra note 12. Indeed, HRIFA and NACARA waive all exclusions except pub­
lic health exclusions, exclusions on criminal grounds, security exclusions (e.g., terrorists and 
Nazis), the exclusion of draft evaders, exclusions for fraudulence and smuggling, and the ex­
clusion against previously removed aliens. This distinction is significant, because the grounds 
for inadmissibility that Congress waived generally render many immigrants ineligible for 
green cards. Consider, for instance, the employment exclusion: if an immigrant wishes to 
work in the United States, the Secretary of Labor must have determined that there are not 
enough available workers at the time and place where the immigrant wishes to work and 
that the immigrant's employment will not affect the wages or conditions of similarly em­
ployed workers - a difficult burden of proof for most immigrants. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5)(A) 
(1994). The only other option for immigrants is not to work, which would mean that they 
would probably soon become welfare recipients, a.k.a. "public charges" (unless they had in­
dependent sources of wealth), and would thus be excludable under the public charge exclu­
sion. 
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temporarily.104 By waiving these important grounds for exclusion that 
apply to most aliens seeking to adjust their status, Congress exempted 
Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Cubans from the grounds of exclusion that 
were probably most likely to prevent their adjustment of status. The 
INS's regulations for HIV-positive applicants undermine Congress's 
efforts to make it easier for HRIF A and NA CARA applicants to ob­
tain permanent residency than for general immigrants, because appli­
cants must obtain the same HIV waiver as general "green card" seek­
ers.105 
B. A Substitute for Asylum 
As discussed in Section Il.B, Congress viewed Haitians, 
Nicaraguans, and Cubans who had fled to the United States as refu­
gees, and intended the Acts to provide humanitarian relief similar to 
that available for refugees - essentially, a substitute for asylum status. 
The legislative history behind the Acts indicates that Congress was 
motivated by the "refugee-like situations" from which these Haitians, 
Nicaraguans, and Cubans fled.106 Recognizing that many HRIFA and 
NACARA applicants would not qualify for asylum status for technical 
legal reasons, even though they deserved the same relief as refugees, 
Congress eliminated the barriers the applicants would face in qualify­
ing for asylum status. For instance, NACARA and HRIFA applicants 
are not required to prove that they would qualify for asylum, nor are 
they required even to have applied for asylum since they arrived in the 
United States.107 Additionally, Congress intended to avoid the long, 
104. See supra Section 11.B (discussing Congress's intent to provide humanitarian immi­
gration relief to NACARA and HRIFA applicants who fled refugee-like situations). 
105. Compare 8 C.F.R. § 245.13(c) (1999), and 8 C.F.R. § 245.15(e)(2) (1999), with 8 
u.s.c. § 1182(g) (1994). 
106. Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immi­
gration, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 35 (1998) (statement of Grover Joseph 
Rees, former General Counsel of the INS) ("They came at a time when their country was 
being ruled by a particularly brutal regime. In the words of President Clinton . . .  'They are 
chopping people's faces off down there.' "). Speaking to this point, Senator Abraham stated: 
[W)ith respect to Nicaraguans, . . .  in the 1980's, this country actively encouraged people 
fearing persecution, fearing death squads, fearing disruptions of their communities to come 
to America. Then we took extraordinary measures to make it feasible for them to stay here, 
even those who had been denied asylum through the official asylum-seeking procedures. 
143 CONG. REC. Sl0,199 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1997) (statement of Sen. Abraham). 
107. Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 
No. 105-277, Title IX (Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 1998), 112 Stat. 2681, 
2681-538 (1998) (extending HRIFA eligibility to all Haitians who have been in the United 
States continuously since December 31, 1995, whether or not they applied for asylum); Dis­
trict of Columbia Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-100, Title II (Nicaraguan Adjustment 
and Central American Relief Act), 111  Stat. 2160, 2194 (1997) (amended by Pub. L. No. 105-
139, 111  Stat. 2644 (1997)) (listing application for asylum as just one possible way for 
NACARA applicants to prove that they have been continuously present in the United 
States since December 1, 1995). 
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expensive process of individualized assessment of each asylum appli­
cation by the INS.108 Congress thereby bypassed the long waiting pe­
riod asylum applicants face due to the backlog of asylum cases, so that 
applicants gain immediate status and rights, which affects their right to 
work and receive public assistance benefits.109 
Congress enacted the Acts partly because there was no guarantee 
that Nicaraguan, Cuban, and Haitian refugees who fled to the United 
States would qualify for asylum status under the Refugee Act of 
1980.110 The Refugee Act, which incorporates the international defini­
tion of "refugee" from the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, requires asylum-seekers to show that there is a reasonable 
possibility that they will be subject to serious human rights violations 
on account of their race, religion, nationality, political opm1on, or 
membership in a particular social group if returned to their home 
country.111 
Several elements of the refugee definition would be difficult for 
many NA CARA and HRIF A applicants to meet. One problem for 
applicants would be showing that they faced a risk of "persecution" as 
defined by asylum caselaw. Persecution is generally understood as a 
serious human rights violation, most notably a threat to life or free­
dom.112 Economic harm alone is usually not considered persecution, 
and refugees who flee to escape economic deprivations or to improve 
their living standards or chances for employment are typically denied 
asylum.113 Many NACARA and HRIFA applicants, particularly 
108. See, e.g., Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Immigration of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 35 (1997) (statement of 
Grover Joseph Rees, former General Counsel of the INS) ("(The HRIFA applicants'] asy­
lum cases have taken years to adjudicate. They have built families here. Some have been 
here 6 years."). 
109. See, e.g., Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Immigration of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 35 (1997) (statement of 
Rep. Oiaz-Balart) ("[T]hese refugees filed asylum petitions, oftentimes during lengthy proc­
essing times, for Immigration to evaluate their claims . . . .  It is estimated that approximately 
4,000 of these asylum claims are still pending."). The backlog of asylum cases reached over 
400,000 in the 1990's. See Martin et al., supra note 93, at 552. 
1 10. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in scat­
tered sections of 8 U.S.C.). Like NACARA and HRIFA, the Refugee Act appears in the 
U.S. Code as amendments to the INA. 
1 11. See supra note 63 (discussing the definition of "refugee"). See generally JAMES C. 
HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 6-11 (1991). The Senate Judiciary Commit­
tee's Report accompanying the Refugee Act of 1980 demonstrates Congress's intent to up­
date the statutory definition of "refugee" to comport with the United States' international 
treaty obligations. See H.R. REP. No. 96-608, at 1 (1979). 
1 12. See generally HATHAWAY, supra note 111 ,  at 112-116 (characterizing "persecution" 
as a serious violation of human rights). 
1 13. See, e.g., Minwalla v. INS, 706 F.2d 831, 835 (8th Cir. 1983) ("Mere economic det­
riment is not sufficient."). See also DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED 
STATES 233-35 (3rd ed. 1999). 
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Haitians, would have difficulty showing that the risk they faced was 
beyond mere economic harm.114 A second problem for most Haitians, 
Cubans, and Nicaraguans would be proving that they faced a risk of 
persecution "on account of" one of the five reasons listed in the Con­
vention.115 The Supreme Court has interpreted this language to require 
an asylum applicant to provide direct or circumstantial evidence that 
his persecutors were motivated to persecute him because of his race, 
religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular 
social group.116 Thus, asylum applicants must make some showing of 
their persecutors' intent to harm them, beyond a threat of indiscrimi­
nate harm to the entire population.117 This persecutory intent require­
ment would be difficult for many NACARA and HRIF A applicants, 
whose fears were based on generalized poverty and violence.118 
Through the Acts, Congress allowed applicants to bypass these asylum 
requirements and provided a substitute for the difficult asylum proc­
ess.119 
114. See Harris, supra note 91, at 278-83 (1993) (discussing the difficulty Haitians have 
qualifying for asylum under U.S. refugee law). 
1 15. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1994) (incorporating the definition of "refugee" from 
the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees to require refugee applicants to 
demonstrate "a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion"). 
116. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992). 
117. See, e.g., Pedro-Mateo v. INS, 224 F.3d 1 147, 1151 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding that 
the facts "do not indicate that the Kanjobal Indians have been recruited because of their 
race, political opinion, or any other protected ground. What they indicate, tragically, is that 
wherever the guerillas clash with the Guatemalan Army, civilians are forcibly recruited by 
both sides to serve in the conflict."); Singh v. INS, 134 F.3d 962, 970 (9th Cir. 1998) ("Peti­
tioner still must demonstrate that the persecution she suffered was 'appreciably different' 
from the hardships suffered by Indo-Fijians in general."); Vides-Vides v. INS, 783 F.2d 1463, 
1469 (9th Cir. 1986) (concluding that the applicant's fear of harm must be "appreciably dif­
ferent from the dangers faced by the alien's fellow citizens"). 
118. For a poignant example of an asylum applicant who feared the denial of her appli­
cation, see Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Im­
migration of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 28 (1997) (statement of 
Louiciana Miclisse) (discussing the experiences that induced her to flee Haiti, namely the 
military's murder of her father, and expressing her fear that she may not qualify for asylum 
under U.S. law: "I understand that even though my parents were killed, my application for 
asylum may be denied."). 
119. See Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Immigration of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 35 (1997) (statement of 
Grover Joseph Rees, former General Counsel of the INS): 
The most important refugee protection law arguably, however, is not any of the specific 
refugee laws, laws that have the word 'refugee' in their title. Rather, it is the Attorney Gen­
eral's power to parole people into the country; that is to allow for their provisional entry, 
even though no law specifically provides for their admission . . . .  The refugee admission pro­
cess is a complicated one. It can take months, or even years, and the problem is we can't al­
ways plan for the existence of refugees. The only people who can plan for whether people 
are going to be persecuted are the persecutors themselves . . . .  The parole power is often bet­
ter suited to that kind of quick reaction than the formal refugee admission process. 
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Like NA CARA and HRIF A, the Refugee Act was humanitarian 
in purpose, based on the United States' duty of "non-refoulement," 
which prevents countries who are parties to the Refugee Convention 
from sending refugees back to countries where they face persecu­
tion.120 Unlike the Acts, Congress specified in the Refugee Act that 
the waiver based on humanitarian purposes should be available to 
HIV-positive refugees.121 Because the plain language of the Acts did 
not indicate which waiver of the HIV exclusion was available to appli­
cants, the INS had a choice in its regulations between the waiver avail­
able for refugees and the waiver available for general immigrants. In 
keeping with Congress's intent to grant NACARA and HRIF A appli­
cants quasi-refugee relief, the INS should have copied the waiver ar­
ticulated in the Refugee Act, as opposed to the waiver in the general 
immigrant provisions of the INA. 
Because the INS did not compare the purposes of the Acts to the 
purposes of the Refugee Act, it did not follow the holistic approach to 
determining Congress's intent that the Supreme Court has recom­
mended. The INS's final rule and response to comments on HRIF A 
indicates that it considered imitating the humanitarian waiver in the 
Refugee Act, at least for HRIFA applicants, but rejected the idea.122 
The agency read the humanitarian waiver available under the refugee 
provision of the INA as applicable only to that section, not to aliens 
applying for adjustment of status under other sections of the INA.123 In 
doing so, the INS stratified the various adjustment of status provisions 
in the INA and failed to utilize other sections of the INA for guidance 
as to legislative intent behind NACARA and HRIF A. Thus, the INS 
took a formalistic approach to interpreting the INA, instead of delving 
into the substantive policy reasons behind the INA's various immigra­
tion provisions.124 In filling the gap Congress left in NACARA and 
Mr. Rees then went on to discuss the need for a more permanent solution to the parole 
power, which NACARA and HRIFA provide. 
120. See HATHAWAY, supra note 111,  at 14 (defining "non-refoulement" as "the duty to 
avoid the return of a refugee to a country where she faces a genuine risk of serious harm"). 
121. See 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(3) (1994) (allowing refugees to apply to the Attorney Gen­
eral for a discretionary waiver "for humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it 
is otherwise in the public interest"). 
122. See Adjustment of Status for Certain Nationals of Haiti, 65 Fed. Reg. 15,835, 15,837 
(Mar. 24, 2000). 
123. See id. : 
When read in its entirety, it is clear that the waiver provision contained in [the refugee pro­
vision] of the Act applies only to aliens who are adjusting status under that section, not to 
aliens who are adjusting status under other provision of law, including HRIFA. The De­
partment does not have the statutory authority to make this change. Accordingly, this sug­
gestion cannot be adopted. 
124. Professor Cass Sunstein supports granting greater latitude to administrative agen­
cies to look beyond the formal text of a statute to implement Congress's policy choices: "As 
against modem formalists, we might urge that administrative agencies should be authorized 
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HRIF A, the agency had a duty to compare the humanitarian purpose 
of NACARA and HRIF A to other immigration provisions motivated 
by similar reasons (such as the Refugee Act) and give HIV-positive 
applicants the opportunity to apply for the humanitarian waiver. 
C. The HIV Exclusion Under Other Special Immigration Measures 
Congress intended the Acts to provide a permanent immigration 
status similar to past ad hoc statutes that transformed temporary, 
emergency immigration relief for groups of refugees fleeing particular 
countries into permanent resident status. These laws, like NACARA 
and HRIF A, represent Congress's decision that the United States 
should not send these refugees back to their home countries for hu­
manitarian reasons. As Senator Abraham stated in the subcommittee 
hearing on HRIF A, the Acts were modeled after these ad hoc meas­
ures.125 Because the Acts have a similar purpose and provide similar 
relief to these special measures, the INS should have looked to the 
HIV waiver available under them when crafting its regulations for 
HIV-positive HRIFA and NACARA applicants. 
Senator Abraham mentioned two recent examples of such ad hoc 
immigration measures. The Chinese Student Protection Act of 1992 
allowed Chinese students who had been involved in the Tiananmen 
Square massacre and had subsequently been granted Deferred En­
forced Departure ("DED") status to adjust their status to permanent 
resident.126 Congress was motivated by both humanitarian and foreign 
policy reasons, as in its consideration of NACARA and HRIFA.127 
to reject the 'text' in situations where common law judges would not be so authorized, at 
least when there is no evidence of a considered legislative judgment against the agency's in­
terpretation." Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism be Defended Empirically?, 66 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 636, 660 (1999). 
125. See Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act: Hearing before the Subcomm. on 
Immigration of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 3 (1997) (remarks of Sen. 
Abraham, chairman of the subcommittee): 
Under U.S. law, one traditional way in which relatively large numbers of individuals paroled 
into the country have gained permanent residence has been for Congress to pass a special 
law that permits this to happen . . . .  The relief accorded to asylum applicants and others from 
Cuba and Nicaragua in this year's Central American relief bill is in that tradition as well. . . .  
In the aftermath of the Tianenmen Square crackdown, Congress passed a law granting law­
ful permanent residence to many of the Chinese nationals who were here in the United 
States at that time . . . .  In 1996, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibil­
ity Act permitted Polish and Hungarian refugees admitted under the Attorney General's pa­
role authority to apply for and gain permanent residence. U.S. immigration law, in my judg­
ment, should not turn on arbitrary distinctions between members of different nationalities. 
126. Chinese Student Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-404, 106 Stat. 1969. See 
also THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID A. MARTIN, AND HIROSHI MOTOMURA, 
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 1164 (4th ed. 1998); Martin et al., 
supra note 93, at 578. 
127. See John D. Griffin, Comment, The Chinese Student Protection Act and "Enhanced 
Consideration" for PRC Nationals: Legitimizing Foreign Policy while Averting False Posi­
tives in Asylum Law, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 1105, 1117-19 (1995) (citing congressional testi-
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Unlike HRIFA and NACARA, the Act enabled HIV-positive stu­
dents to apply for the same humanitarian waiver of inadmissibility 
available for refugees.128 Another recent immigration remedy that is 
almost identical to NA CARA and HRIF A was passed as part of 
IIRIRA, and provides adjustment of status to permanent residence for 
certain Polish and Hungarian nationals who were paroled into the 
United States between 1989 and 1991 and were denied refugee 
status.129 Congress intended this provision to amend a "bureaucratic 
error" that prevented these people who had been paroled into the 
country for humanitarian reasons years earlier from adjusting their 
status to permanent resident.130 This law also contained the humani­
tarian waiver of the HIV exclusion. 
One might argue that because Congress explicitly indicated which 
waiver should be available for HIV-positive applicants in both of the 
above statutes, it would have done so in HRIFA and NACARA if it 
had intended for a less stringent waiver to be available. But as was dis­
cussed above, Congress did not mention waivers of inadmissibility at 
all in HRIF A and NA CARA, but merely indicated which grounds of 
inadmissibility were completely waived. Because the plain language of 
the Act did not answer the waiver question, the INS was left with the 
responsibility of determining which waiver Congress intended. Since 
the above statutes are similar to HRIF A and NA CARA in terms of 
the type of relief they provide and Congress's reasons for enacting 
them, Chevron requires the INS to look to the HIV waivers under 
these statutes rather than the general adjustment of status provision of 
the INA. To be consistent with congressional intent, the INS should 
have allowed HIV-positive applicants under HRIFA and NACARA 
to apply for the more accessible waiver of the HIV exclusion. 
This Part argued that the INS, in requiring HIV-positive HRIFA 
and NACARA applicants to apply for a waiver based on a family rela­
tionship to a United States citizen or permanent resident, contradicted 
Congress's intent. By analogizing the type of relief granted and the 
mony that the "deeper purpose" of the legislation was the promotion of democracy and capi­
talism and the condemnation of communism). Griffin emphasizes the discriminatory effect 
of Congress's favorable treatment of Chinese students compared to its negative response to 
Haitians fleeing the military coup of 1991. Id. at 1120, 1158-60. 
128. Chinese Student Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-404 § 2(a)(3)(B), 106 Stat. 
1969 (specifying the availability of a waiver to the public health exclusion based on humani­
tarian reasons, family unity, or public interest). 
129. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-709. 
130. See 142 CONG. REC. Hll,081 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996) (Statement of Rep. Hyde) 
(speaking in support of the Conference Report on IIRIRA): 
This omnibus legislation includes a number of miscellaneous provisions that are responsive 
to a range of problems . . . .  We also recognize the equities of certain nationals of Poland and 
Hungary who were paroled into the United States years ago - and thus entered our country 
legally - by affording them an opportunity to adjust to permanent resident status. 
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purposes of the Acts to other immigration provisions, the INS should 
have recognized that Congress intended HRIF A and NA CARA to be 
more like refugee status and other special immigration statutes rather 
than adjustment of status for general immigrants. To carry out legisla­
tive intent, the INS should have copied the waiver in these special im­
migration provisions, based on humanitarian purposes, rather than the 
waiver for general immigrants. 
CONCLUSION 
Congress enacted the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central 
American Relief Act of 1997 and the Haitian Refugee Immigration 
Fairness Act of 1998 to provide permanent immigration remedies to 
refugees fleeing inhumane situations in countries toward which the 
United States has long demonstrated a foreign policy commitment. 
The HIV exclusion of immigrants was enacted primarily for financial 
reasons, while Congress's purpose behind HRIF A and NACARA was 
primarily humanitarian. The INS, charged with developing regulations 
to further congressional mandates, should have recognized that Con­
gress intended these Acts to be similar to the Refugee Act and other 
special immigration measures, and allowed HIV-positive applicants to 
obtain a waiver based on humanitarian purposes. Because the INS did 
not follow Congress's clear intent or, in the alternative, did not inter­
pret Congress's purposes reasonably, the waiver regulation should be 
vacated by courts or voluntarily changed by the INS. Alternatively, 
Congress should pass an amendment to the Acts that specifies that the 
humanitarian waiver is available for HIV-positive applicants. These 
reforms are necessary to fulfill Congress's goal of providing wide­
spread immigration relief to refugees from Haiti, Cuba, and 
Nicaragua. 
